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INTRODUCTION
Something remarkable happened to the author of this piece on
October of 2000-he received an absentee ballot to vote for the
President and Vice President of the United States. For many electors,
there is nothing remarkable about this event. Every four years, thou-
sands of Americans receive absentee ballot materials, including a
presidential ballot, from their states. What makes this event peculiar
is that the author of this piece is a resident of Puerto Rico' and the
absentee materials were sent not by a state, but by the Puerto Rico
government. As the United States went through one of its closest
2elections in years, most Americans were unaware that, for at least a
month, the federal courts had put Puerto Rico and eight additional
electoral votes at play.3
It started when three men from the western coastal town of
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico sued4 to remedy one side effect of the deplor-
• J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S.F.S., 1999, Georgetown
University.
I From 1900 to 1932, "Puerto Rico was officially misspelled as 'Porto Rico'-a result of the
incorrect spelling of the island's name in the English version of the Treaty of Paris." Jost A.
CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 1, n.1 (1979). "Puerto Ricans had objected
'that there [did] not even exist the pretext of changing the name to Americanize [Puerto
Rico], since porto is not an English but a Portuguese word.'" Id. (quoting 33 CONG. REC. app.
233 (1900) (statement of Rep. Jones)).
The Electoral College results for the 2000 election were 271 votes for George W. Bush and
266 for Albert Gore. CNN.com, Election 2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION2000
(last visited Aug. 6, 2001).
3 According to the 2000 Census, the resident population of Puerto Rico is 3,808,610.
United States Census Bureau, at http://ww.census.gov/dmd/wv/resapport/states/ puerto-
rico.pdf. If Puerto Rico becomes a state, this would translate into at least six representatives, in
addition to the two senators.
4 See Igartda de la Rosa v. United States (Igartfia 1), 842 F. Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1994) (denying
dedaratory and injunctive relief that would have allowed Puerto Ricans to vote in presidential
elections and dismissing plaintiffi' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted), aff'd, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Igartfia de Ia Rosa v. United States (Igartfia
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able political condition of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico:? their in-
ability to vote, as United States citizens, for the President and Vice
President. In fifty years, Puerto Rico went from being the stricken
land to the showcase of democracy. 6 In those same remarkable fifty
years, however, the fundamental underpinnings of the island's rela-
tionship with the United States have remained unaltered-Puerto
Rico remains the oldest colony in the world.7  These men sued to
II), 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R. 2000) (entering final judgment finding United States citizens
in Puerto Rico have the right to vote for representatives of the electoral college in presidential
elections and ordering the Puerto Rico government to create mechanisms by which those citi-
zens could vote in the elections), rev'd, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000). Also note that the govern-
ment in the original suit of Igarala II brought a motion to dismiss the suit, which was denied.
See 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000).
s Persons born in Puerto Rico are United States citizens at birth. Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1999) ("All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after
January 13, 1941, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United
States at birth."). Thus, they do not need a passport to visit the United States and, in fact, use a
United States passport to travel internationally. Their condition and rights as citizens, however,
are different from those who reside in the mainland. The residents of Puerto Rico do not pay
federal taxes, but receive approximately $13 billion in federal funds, including Medicare, Medi-
caid, and welfare benefits. Dan Perry, Puerto Rico Wants Say in U.S. Vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29037278. They have served in the United States
military forces since World War I and their valor in defense of liberty and freedom has been
well documented. See Guillermo Moscoso, Decolonizing P.R Justifies Fallen War Heroes, THE SAN
JUAN STAR, May 25, 1998, available at http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/1997-98misc/moscoso-
19980525.shtml ("Memorial Day to us in Puerto Rico means honoring over 1,000 Puerto Ricans
killed in action in the wars in which the United States has been involved .... Puerto Rico's par-
ticipation in the above-mentioned wars was greater than the participation of 22 states of the Un-
ion ... ."). After one hundred years as part of the American Empire, however, these people still
are not represented in the body that holds plenary authority over their island. Puerto Ricans do
not have any say in the election of the President and Commander-in-Chief that sends their sons
and daughters to fight in foreign lands and controls naval bases and other military installations
throughout the island. The flags of Puerto Rico and the United States always fly together, a
symbol of a "rigorous maintained balance of identity." Id. For background discussion on the
history of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico, see infra Part I.
6 Puerto Rico "had remained mired in social and economic stagnation for the four centu-
ries following Christopher Columbus's landing in 1493...." A.W. MALDONADO, TEODORO
MOSCOSO AND PUERTO RICO'S OPERATION BOOTSTRAP, at xi-xii (1997). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt referred to Puerto Rico as "hopeless," id. at xii (quoting ERNEST GRUENING, MANY
BATrLES-AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 181 (1973)), and the last American governor called it "the
stricken land." REXFORD GUY TUGWELL, THE STRICKEN LAND: THE STORY OF PUERTO RICO
(Greenwood Press 1968) (1946). In the 1950's, however, Puerto Rico had become the "Show-
case of Democracy---a laboratory proving that poor societies can improve their lot under a
democratic, free-enterprise system." MALDONADO, supra, at 116. Time called it the "Democracy
Laboratory in Latin America," explaining that the island had "clawed its way in fifteen years to a
nearly doubled standard of living.. .. " Id. at 116-17 (quoting TIME, June 23, 1958); see also infra
note 62. See generally HARVEY S. PERLOFF, PUERTO Rico's ECONOMIC FUTURE: A STUDY IN
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1950) (documenting the historic and current trends in the
Puerto Rican economy and discussing principles and programs of planned economic develop-
ment).
7 See generallyJos TRiAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE
WORLD 107 (1997) ("Commonwealth, with all its faults, has served Puerto Rico well, but at-
tempting to hide its shortcomings and pretending that all is well in the oldest colony in the
world does a disservice to both the people of Puerto Rico and the government of the United
States."). Jos6 Trfas Monge, a former Chief'Justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, was
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8change this. And their challenge, although ridiculous to some,
brings into the spotlight questions ranging from the existence of a
right to vote for the President under the Constitution to the need to
re-evaluate the usefulness and constitutional validity of America's ter-
ritorial policy.
In the middle of what already had been a tumultuous election sea-
son in Puerto Rico,9 the United States District Court responded. On
one of the chief architects of the Commonwealth status and a member of the constitutional
convention that drew up the Puerto Rico Constitution.
8 SeeDan Perry, supra note 5 ("[S1o many people condemned the idea as a sham and mere
'beauty contest.'"); Zena Polin, Puerto Ricans Win Right To Vote on Nov. 7 but Appeals Court Might
Reverse Ruling WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2000, at A12 (quoting Anibal Acevedo Vili, the vice presi-
dent of the Popular Democratic Party, calling the whole process "a sham"); id. (quotingJose M.
GonzAlez-Rodrfguez, a Puerto Rican lawyer and litigation consultant, who argued that the law
was clear and that the residents of Puerto Rico had no constitutional right to participate in
presidential elections); see alsoJohn Marino, For Puerto Rico, an Election of Ifs; Territory Sets Vote for
President but Court Must Decide If Ballots Count; WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2000, at A3 (quoting John
Killian, a constitutional expert with the Congressional Research Service, describing the district
court's argument as "wrong").
9 Puerto Rican politics is deeply polarized among the three main status alternatives: state-
hood, supported by the New Progressive Party (NPP); Commonwealth, supported by the Popu-
lar Democratic Party (PDP); and independence, supported by the Puerto Rican Independence
Party. The candidate for the New Progressive Party or the Popular Democratic Party has been
elected governor in every election since 1948. Jos6 Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle
of Liberty: An Alternative View of the Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REv. JUR. U. P.R. 1, 18-
19(1999). See generally REECE B. BOTHWELL, ORIGENES Y DESARROLLO DE LOS PARTIDOS
POLtICOS EN PUERTO RICO (1988). The NPP, under the leadership of Pedro Rossell6, won the
1992 and 1996 elections with a platform stressing market liberalization, privatization of gov-
emnment-owned enterprises, smaller government, privately administered health coverage, and
school vouchers. EDGARDO MEL±NDEZ, MOVIMIENTo ANEXIONISTA EN PUERTO Rico 289 (1993).
In the 1996 election, Rossell6 became the first candidate for governor to garner over one mil-
lion votes and the first to surpass the 50 percent barrier since 1964. See Comisi6n Estatal de
Elecctiones de Puerto Rico, Consulta de Resultados, at http://wwvw.ceepur.net/cgi-
bin/municipios.pl. (reporting election results from 1992-2000).
The division also extends to political status preferences. In 1967, in a referendum boy-
cotted by the Statehood Republican Party and several pro-independence groups, Common-
wealth received 60.4 percent of the vote, statehood 39 percent, and independence 0.6 percent.
Id. In the next referendum, in 1993, Commonwealth received 48.6 percent of the vote, state-
hood 46.3 percent, and independence 4.4 percent. Id. In 1998 another referendum took
place, but one where the PDP was unwilling to favor Commonwealth status subject to the ple-
nary powers of Congress and campaigned for "None of the above." In this referendum, "None
of the above" received 50.3 percent of the vote, statehood 46.5 percent and independence 2.5
percent. Id.
Choosing among the options is not as simple as it seems. Independence provides sover-
eignty and the opportunity to protect and reaffirm Puerto Rico's cultural identity. Still, it poses
significant questions regarding economic development, especially in an island heavily depend-
ent on federal transfers and greatly interwoven with the American economy. Statehood, on the
other hand, promises full and equal membership in the United States, along with the prospects
of economic development and the extension of all rights and responsibilities as United States
citizens. There are, however, pressing questions regarding the effects of federal taxation on the
island's economy and the fear of cultural assimilation.
The tumultuous 2000 election began when then-incumbent governor, Pedro Rossell6,
announced that he would not seek a third consecutive term and his Secretary of Transportation
and Public Works, Carlos Pesquera, became the nominee of the NPP. See generally Ivan Roman,
Puerto Rico Puts Its Hopes on Rail Line, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 2000, at Al ("Carlos
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July 19, 2000, Senior District Court Judge Jaime Pieras delivered an
opinion and order,' ° later supplemented by a final opinion and or-
der," declaring that the United States citizens of Puerto Rico had a
constitutionally protected right to vote for the President and Vice
President of the United States. The court also ordered the Gov-
ernment of Puerto Rico to organize the means by which to appoint
Presidential electors. The Government of Puerto Rico went ahead
as ordered and even printed out ballots with the names and pictures
of George W. Bush and Al Gore. 4 The prospect of the President of
the Senate receiving the electoral votes from Puerto Rico disappeared
soon enough, however, as the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed Igartfta II almost a month before the electons.'3
The after-effects did not disappear so easily.16
Pesquera, the former transportation head who oversaw all major infrastructure projects until he
stepped down last year to run for governor for the pro-statehood New Progressive Party....").
Subsequently, the government and the statehood party came under intense heat for a series of
corruption cases against high-profile party members. See generally John Marino, U.S. Corruption
Prosecutions Rock Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2000, at A3 ("For two years, federal prosecu-
tors here have secured a stream of public corruption indictments. Municipal mayors, heads of
nonprofit social service agencies, government bureaucrats, contractors and political party offi-
cials have all faced charges in the ongoing probe."). More importantly, the election year was
dominated, and the people of Puerto Rico polarized, by the events surrounding the United
States Navy's activities in the small island of Vieques, off the eastern coast of Puerto Rico. Id. In
April 1999, a Puerto Rican civilian, while performing his duties as a security guard for the Navy,
was accidentally killed during one of the training sessions that the Navy conducted in Vieques
since 1941. Manuel Ernesto Rivera, Protesters Gather as Navy Prepares To Resume Vieques Bombing,
WASH. POST, June 25, 2000, at A5. That event re-ignited the highly nationalistic movement to
get the Navy out of Vieques. See generally 25 Vieques Activists Freed Without Bai WASH. POST, May
16, 2000, at A10 ("Twenty-five protesters charged with trespassing at the Navy's Vieques bomb-
ing range over the weekend were released without bail today to cheers from supporters.");
Sylvia Moreno, Navy Protest Intensifies: Officials Urge Clinton To Defuse Puerto Rican Showdown,
WASH. POST, May 4, 2000, at A3 ("[A] ragtag group of protesters little known outside this island
town, the dissidents, and their cause, drew supporters from as far away as Chicago and New
York to their turf-a dozen illegal seaside camps that are reachable only by boat."); Rivera, su-
pra, at A5 ("Islanders say five decades of live bombing have caused environmental damage, con-
taminated water supplies, stunted tourism, destroyed fishing grounds and led to a higher can-
cer rate.").
"' Igarttia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartiia II), 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000).
" Igarttia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartfia II), 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R. 2000).
12 Id. at 242.
13 Id.
14 Nilka Estrada Resto, Sigue Vvigente la Ley Local para la Comisidn Estatal, EL NUEVO DiA (San
Juan), Oct. 14, 2000, available at http://endi.zonai.com/politica/html/p3lal3mlO.asp (last visited
Oct. 16, 2000) (explaining that the state electoral commission had received 2.7 million of the 3
million ballots that it had ordered).
15 Igartsia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartiia I), 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000).
16 This was not the first time that the question of granting Puerto Ricans residing in the is-
land the right to vote arose. In 1970, during the administration of the first pro-statehood gov-
ernor, Luis A. Ferr6, an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee was formed to study the issue. Although
the effort concentrated on starting the constitutional amendment process, many of the passions
raised by Igartfia II, and even the argument that Puerto Ricans could vote for the President
without amending the Constitution, also arose during that process. See David M. Helfeld, The
Constitutional and Legal Feasibility of the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico, in SIX SPECIAL STUDIES
REQUESTED FOR THE AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO Rico 87,
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At the political level, the insistence by the pro-statehood
7 gov
ernment to prepare ballots for the presidential election was perceived
as yet another bold and consensus-breaking action by the Rossell6
administration and further electrified the nationalist forces that had
taken center stage in the election season.' Prominent political lead-
ers called for voters to reject the presidential ballot by writing "Peace
for Vieques" on it.'9 The decision also divided the statehood move-
ment.2 0 Former Governor and Resident Commissioner Carlos Ro-
mero Barcel6 hesitated with the idea, believing that the decision was
going to be reversed quickly.2' In a more ideological twist, many sup-
92 (1971) (explaining that the possibility of granting the right to vote to Puerto Ricans without
a constitutional amendment had been "posed in the press and in popular discussions."); see also
5JosI TRiAs MONGE, HISTORIA CoNSTrrUCIONAL DE PUERTO Rico 83 (1994) ("One of the favor-
ite arguments at that moment, frequently espoused by statehood supporters, was that the presi-
dential vote could be granted without an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
either by legislative orjudicial action."). Igartfia 11, then, suddenly opened a Pandora's box that
man believed had been shut.
The statehood movement began before the American occupation in 1898, but strength-
ened with the founding of the Puerto Rico Republican Party right after the occupation. The
Republicans dominated the elections of 1900 and 1904 and again, as part of a coalition with two
other parties, from 1924 until 1940. In the 1940s, the Republicans began losing much of their
electoral support, as the Popular Democratic Party, led by the "father" of Commonwealth, Luis
Munoz Marin, dominated every electoral event until 1968. After the Republican Party refused
to defend statehood in the 1967 referendum, Luis A. Ferr6 founded a new organization, United
Statehooders. This organization later became the New Progressive Party, which won the elec-
tions of 1968 after a split in the Popular Democratic Party. The New Progressive Party lost in
1972, but won again, under the leadership of Carlos Romero BarceI6, in the 1976 and 1980
elections. After losing in 1984 and 1988, the New Progressive Party won in 1992 and 1996 un-
der the leadership of Pedro Rossell6. MELtNDEZ, supra note 9, at 1-3.
Today, the statehood movement encompasses various social and economic classes, but
with particularly strong support in the higher and lower economic classes. Id. at 8-9. The in-
credible growth of pro-statehood forces in the last thirty years also has polarized the island,
producing a parallel nationalistic, anti-statehood movement. The anti-statehood movement
finds particular support in labor unions, the University of Puerto Rico, cultural and performing
arts organizations, environmental groups, the Catholic Church, and some sectors of the press.
Luis DAvuA COLWN, LA DICTADURA DE LA PRENSA 101-06 (1999).
is SeeMarino, supra note 8 ("[C]ritics of the Rossell6 administration say that the push for the
presidential vote is a back door way of pushing its statehood agenda."); Polin, supra note 8
(quoting Anibal Acevedo Vila, who argued that the government was trying to "divert people's
attention from real issues, such as rampant government corruption, fraud and illegal use of
public funds"); Puerto Rico Court Halts Voting Bid, Some Wanted a Say in Presidential Race, WASH.
PoST, Nov. 3, 2000, atA10 (quoting Carlos Gorrin Peralta, a lawyer for the Puerto Rican Inde-
pendence Party, who described the attempts to claim the right to participate in presidential
elections as an abuse of power and an imposition upon the people of Puerto Rico); see also
Perry, supra note 5 (quoting Puerto Rican Independence Party leader Ruben Berrfos, who
stated: "This was a mechanism for [statehooders] to try to push statehood through the back
door.").
19 Polin, supra note 8.
20 Ivan Roman, Puerto Rico's Status Again Splits Island, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 31, 2000, at
A8 ("Even some of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party's own leaders acknowledge the
problem. Sen. Sergio Pena Clos warned his colleagues not to mislead the people."). But see
Perry, supra note 5 (quoting Kenneth McClintock, a Puerto Rican lawmaker, statehood sup-
porter, and strong defender of the attempt to give Puerto Ricans the right to vote in presiden-
tial elections).
21 See Roman, supra note 20 ("Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barcel6 said that, as a
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porters of statehood-most of them privately-were questioning the
wisdom of Puerto Ricans acquiring the right to vote in presidential
elections from judicial fiat, and not from admission as a state of the
union.
In the legal context, the decision raises-and this Comment deals
with-many of the fascinating and perpetual issues surrounding the
constitutional framework of the United States-Puerto Rico relation-
ship. First, the claim of a right to vote for the President raises ques-
tions about the kind of citizenship that Puerto Ricans possess. Are
the United States citizens of Puerto Rico "equal" with those of the
mainland and entitled to enjoy a constitutional right to vote? Which
constitutional rights apply to the United States citizens of Puerto
Rico?
Second, the case raises questions regarding the nature of presi-
dential elections in the United States and the right of the people to
vote in them--questions that garnered additional relevance in the
wake of the 2000 election contest and America's collective re-reading
of Article 11.22 Who has the right to vote for the President and Vice
President, the citizens or the states? What have been the effects of
the Supreme Court statements describing the right to vote as a fun-
damental right protected by the Constitution? The confusion reign-
ing in American jurisprudence regarding the answer to these ques-
tions played an important role in the Igartda 11 court's holding.
Finally, and most importantly, the decision raises questions about
the treatment of the territories under constitutional law. One hun-
dred years ago, during the Spanish American War, the United States
went through a remarkable transformation. No longer the neutral
continental power, the United States became an administrator of for-
eign lands.2 Scrapping the original policy of treating territories as
lawrer, he thought the judge's decision would be revoked.").
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress... .").
23 SeeTreaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Dec.
10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris] ("Spain cedes to
the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in
the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones."); see also CABRANES, su-
pra note 1, at 1-4 ("The acquisition[s] ... signaled the rise of the United States to the position
of a world power [and] ... revealed in microcosm many of the characteristics of America's new
role in world affairs: an abiding sense of mission and a certain nobility of purpose; a belief in
the superiority of American institutions and values; an insensitivity or indifference to peoples
and values imperfectly understood; and an ambivalence about the exercise of power combined
with a deeply rooted innocence."). In 1916, the United States acquired the Danish West Indies
(currently the United States Virgin Islands). ARTURO MORALES CARRION, PUERTO Rico: A
POLITICAL AND CULTURAl. HISTORY 198 (1983) ("The treaty [of purchase] was signed on August
4, 1916, and presented to Congress as a way of thwarting German ambitions in the Caribbean.
Under Article VI, the inhabitants who did not declare within a year their intention to preserve
their citizenship in Denmark were held to have renounced it and to have accepted American
citizenship."); accord JUAN M. GARciA PASSALAcQUA, INVADIENDO AL INVASOR 77 (1999).
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"states-in-training," 4 the Supreme Court gave judicial backing to
these imperialist designs and created the constitutionally dubious dis-
tinction between incorporated territories and unincorporated terri-
tories25 America no longer had to promise statehood to its territo-
ries; it could hold them permanently in the game of European
imperialism the Founding Fathers had so despised in 1776.
This doctrine was wrong one hundred years ago, and it cries for a
revision today. Surprisingly, due to a combination of neglect, con-
venience, and disinterest, this doctrine, and the territorial policy it
entails, has not been seriously re-evaluated. The United States has
over four million citizens living in permanent colonies; yet, it is no
closer than it was one hundred years ago to understanding how they
fit within its constitutional framework. Igartfia II took the challenge
directly and posed the question of why territories cannot be included
under "states" for the purposes of Article II of the Constitution. Any
responsible answer to this question requires serious rethinking of the
status of territories under constitutional law. This Comment seeks to
throw the first stone.
This Comment will focus on whether the United States citizens of
Puerto Rico have a right to vote for the President under the current
legal and constitutional framework, and on how the answer to this
question highlights the need to re-evaluate the status of territories
within American constitutional law. The Comment will not discuss
the wisdom of extending the right to vote in presidential elections by
amending the Constitution. Neither does it dwell specifically on the
right of United States citizens of other territories to vote in such elec-
tions.27 Finally, the Comment avoids entering into the never-ending
debate surrounding the current Commonwealth status and the ef-
fects these changes had-if any-on the status of Puerto Rico within
24 Shively v. Bowilby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894) ("The territories acquired by Congress, whether
by deed of cession from the original States, or by treaty with a foreign country, are held with the
object, as soon as their population and condition justify it, of being admitted into the Union as
States .... "); L6PEz BARALT, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS ITS TERRITORIES
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PUERTO Rico 237 (1999) ("Up to that time [(1898)] territories had
eventually become States of the Union."); Jamin Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia
and the Right To Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39, 52 (1999) ("In the American system, territo-
ries are designed to be the principal states-in-training.").
SeeDownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (distinguishing between incorporated and
unincorporated territories and explaining that in treating unincorporated territories "there
may nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed,
although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution"); see also L6PEZ BARALT, supra
note 24, at 299 ("If unincorporated, then only such provisions of the Constitution protecting
the fundamental rights of citizenship were to apply."). See generally Gonzilez v. Williams, 192
U.S. 1 (1904); DeLimav. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes, 182 U.S. at 244.
26 See generally SIX SPECIAL STUDIES, supra note 16 (discussing the proposals in 1970 to grant
Puerto Ricans the right to vote for the President); 5 TRiAS MONGE, supra note 16, at 48-91.
The general principles, however, also should be applicable to other unincorporated terri-
tories of the United States where residents are United States citizens, such as Guam, the North-
em Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
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the United States constitutional framework. Although this is a very
worthy subject, time and space constraints force us to assume that
Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status would not affect the ability of
the residents of Puerto Rico to participate in presidential elections.
Part I provides a background to Puerto Rican history, specifically
its political relationship with the United States. Part II discusses the
holding of the district court granting the right to vote and the court
of appeals' reversal. Part III focuses on the limitations of the United
States citizenship possessed by Puerto Ricans and how these could af-
fect the right to vote espoused by Igart(ta 1I. Part IV analyzes Igart~ta
I's main reasoning behind extending the right to vote for the Presi-
dent to Puerto Ricans: The right to vote is a fundamental right of
citizenship and Puerto Ricans, as United States citizens, cannot be
denied such right. Finally, Part V analyzes the other reasoning pro-
vided by Igart~ia II in support of granting Puerto Ricans the right to
vote for the President: The word "state" in Article II of the Constitu-
tion does not exclude territories.
The Comment concludes that the right to vote for the President
of the United States is not a constitutional right. There has been a
trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence to view voting for the Presi-
dent as a right, but this trend has not been consummated and is of
doubtful constitutionality. Supreme Court ambiguity surrounding
the interpretation of the word "state" in the Constitution, however,
leaves the ground fertile for an argument calling for an expansive in-
terpretation-one that would include territories and allow its resi-
dents to participate in presidential elections. More importantly, the
Comment argues that the case at least calls for a re-examination of
the status of territories within the American constitutional landscape.
The United States has become the administrator of permanent terri-
tories. The Constitution dealt with territories in the context of
"states-in-training," yet the Supreme Court-either by neglect or con-
venience-created and has maintained an imperialist doctrine allow-
ing the United States to become an administrator of permanent terri-
tories. History may have made the United States an administrator of
territories, but those territories are populated by United States citi-
zens who deserve better than second-class citizenship, limited rights,
and restricted access to political processes. The time has come for
the United States to revamp its century-old constitutional understand-
ing of its territories in favor of a framework that promises the territo-
ries and their citizens full political participation.
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I. CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICS IN PUERTO RICO: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
FROM THE SPANISH KINGDOM TO THE AMERICAN EMPIRE2 s
The island of Puerto Rico, which had been invaded and occupied
by the United States during the Spanish American War, was ceded
from Spain to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of
Paris of 18 98 .2' Breaking away from precedent, the Treaty of Paris
did not grant United States citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico."0 In what has become an infamous provision, Article IX of the
28 This historical background begins with the invasion and occupation of Puerto Rico by the
United States during the Spanish American War of 1898, which is the relevant starting point for
this work. The exclusion of a discussion of the Spanish era should not be interpreted as insig-
nificant, however. The four centuries of Spanish rule, along with a strong Afro-Antillean influ-
ence, left a permanent mark on the cultural, religious, political, and social development of the
people of Puerto Rico.
Before the American invasion, a concept of patria (nationhood) was already well estab-
lished among the masses in Puerto Rico. Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, La Falsedad del Can6n:
Aruillsis Citico de la Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico, 65 REv.JUR. U.P.R. 589, 591 (1996);
see also TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 19 ("At the end of the nineteenth century Puerto Rico
had thus a well-defined national identity, a strong sense of its own culture, part of the Spanish-
speaking Latin American and Caribbean communities, with its own singularities and as much
right as others to freedom and respect."). This embrace of nationhood had some political ex-
pressions, such as the failed armed revolt against Spain in 1867 (the Grito de Lares) and was
decisive in the formation of Puerto Rican culture and identity. Among the elite, however, the
support for the cause of independence was weaker than, for instance, in Cuba and other Latin
American countries. See Jost LuIs GONz.ALEZ, EL PAiS DE CUATRO PISOS Y OTRos ENSAYOS
(1985).
Yet, this lack of support for independence, both in the past and in the present, should not
be confused with a lack of pride or weak sense of identity. The people of Puerto Rico have a
strong sense of nationhood and national pride--one that survived the Americanization policies
of the early twentieth century and unites all Puerto Ricans above party lines. See GARCiA
PASSALACQUA, supra note 23, at 230 ("Despite the direct and indirect pressures to Americanize
felt during the entire twentieth century, a majority of Puerto Ricans do not consider themselves
as 'essentially Americans.' The collective identity of Puerto Ricans has been influenced by its
relationship with the United States, but Puerto Ricans have retained their identity. ... ")
(author's translation). This prevailing sense of "Puerto Ricanness" is reflected in the resur-
gence of nationalistic musical compositions. See, eg., MARC ANTHONY, Predosa, on DESDE UN
PRINcIPIo-FRoM THE BEGINNING (Sony Discos 1999); LUCEcITA BENTEZ, Verde Luz, on EN VIVO
DESDE EL CARNEGIE HALL (BMG/U.S. Latin 2000); ELJUNTE, Boricua en la Luna, on UNJUNTE
PAA LA HISTORIA (Acisum Group 1999). Even the statehood movement has been influenced by
this phenomenon. Since the late 1920's, the statehood movement abandoned calls for cultural
assimilation to the United States, instead developing the concept of"jibaro statehood"---the idea
that Puerto Ricans can maintain their identity and culture as a state of the union. MELINDEZ,
supra note 9, at 9. The statehood movement also stresses the use of both the Puerto Rican and
United States flag at their rallies and official functions.
Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754 ("Spain cedes to the United
States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.").
so See L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 278 ("All the treaties and agreements, beginning with
the cession of part of the Northwest Ordinance by Virginia to the acquisition of Alaska con-
tained provisions guaranteeing to the inhabitants of the ceded land the privileges, rights and
immunities of the citizens of the United States and promising incorporation to the territory.");
see also, e.g., LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (1934); 1
WVESTEL WOODBURY VILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 444
(1910).
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Treaty stated that "the civil rights and political status of the native in-
habitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by Congress."
3'
A. The Foraker Act Years (1900-1916)
The inhabitants of the island remained under a military regime
and in political limbo32 until 1900, when the Foraker Act 3 established
a civil government for Puerto Rico. The Foraker Act provided for a
governor to be appointed by the President of the United States, six
government departments whose heads were also appointed by the
President, and a Legislative Assembly composed of two chambers.-
The higher chamber was composed of the six department heads and
31 Treaty of Paris, supra note 29 at art. IX (emphasis added).
32 The following statement best summarizes this state of uncertainty immediately after the
occupation: "The occupation has been a perfect failure. We have suffered everything. No lib-
erty, no rights, absolutely no protection .... We are Mr. Nobody from Nowhere. We have no
political status, no civil rights." TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 40, citing Hearings on H.R 6883,
56th Cong. 103 (1900) (statement of Dr.Julio Henna).
Still, many Puerto Ricans-both in the elite and the masses-were originally satisfied with
the coming of American rule. See MORALES CARRI6N, supra note 23, at 140-41 ("Most of the lib-
eral elite rejoiced at the coming of the Americans. The reaction covered a wide spectrum:
there were those who offered their services to [General] Miles in the belief that the landing
meant the coming of freedom to the island. Others along the southern coast, who had favored
the separation of Puerto Rico from Spain, joined the American troops as interpreters or
scouts."); FERNANDO Pic6, HISTORIA GENERAL DE PUERTO Rico 229-30 (5th ed. 1990) ("Among
some business people and landowners in the island there was an illusion that the annexation of
Puerto Rico as a state of the Union was imminent and that it would bring increased prosperity
to the sugar industry.") (author's translation); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND
PUERTO Rico: THE DOcTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 21 (1985) ("Despite pre-invasion flag-
waving by some Puerto Rican politicos, the Americans were received with open arms in Puerto
Rico." (citations omitted)). But see MORALES CARRI6N, supra, at 142 ("Some Puerto Ricans had
high expectations, others faced the change with ambivalent feelings."). After all, the United
States was a progressive and democratic country-the beacon of liberty. Regardless of their po-
litical preference, most Puerto Ricans felt optimistic that under the tutelage of the United
States the route toward self-determination would clear rapidly. Thus, there was deep disap-
pointment when the United States failed to improve on Spain's despotic ways. See TORRUELLA,
supra, at 119 ("Although autocratic action had come to be expected from Spain, such behavior,
when coming from the United States, bitterly disappointed Puerto Rican expectations of
American democratic traditions."). This disappointment found different expressions, as di-
cussed byJuan Torruella:
The Puerto Rican independence movement, even today, and in both its peaceful and
violent phases, is a direct result of the legitimate frustration of Puerto Rico and Puerto
Ricans with the colonial policies commencing with the Foraker Act .... As long as
Puerto Rico is given separate and unequal treatment by the rest of the Nation, with such
discrimination being sanctioned by all branches of government, including the judiciary,
Puerto Rico's U.S. citizenry will continue to feel alienated from its Mainland compatri-
ots, and a glimmer ofjustification can be claimed by even those committing reprehensi-
ble acts of violence.
See id. at 133
Organic Act of April 12, 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, amended by Organic Act of 1917, ch.
145, 39 Stat. 951.
Organic Act of April 12, 1900 §§ 17-30.
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five Puerto Rican-born citizens3 5 The lower chamber was composed
of elected citizens who could read and write English or Spanish and
owned property.36  The United States Congress was the supreme
authority, since it could annul any law approved by the Puerto Rican
legislature. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was the highest ju-
dicial authority, but the President also appointed its members.s
More importantly, the Foraker Act set forth the economic princi-
ples underlying the relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico. One of the most controversial provisions of the Fora-
ker Act was the tariff charged on "all merchandise coming into
Puerto Rico from the United States."40  Since the adoption of this
provision presumably violated the United States Constitution,41 the
provision became the battleground for differing views on American
territorial policy. One school of thought, defended by Carman F.
Randolph, argued that the Constitution followed the flag-"new ter-
ritories could be acquired by conquest or cession, but only to be gov-
erned subject to the full limitations of the Constitution and solely
with the purpose of eventually admitting them to the Union in equal-
ity with other states."42  A second school of thought, espoused by
Dean Langdell of Harvard Law School, argued the opposite, "main-
taining that the constitutional restrictions applied only to the States
and not to the territories, for which reason Congress had the most
untrammeled power legislation over the new dependencies."4' A
Id. § 18.
Id. § 27.
37 Id. § 31.
33 Id. § 33.
39 See Garcia Passalacqua, supra note 28, at 596 (arguing that the Foraker Act had little to do
with self-government and much to do with establishing the economic bases of the relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico, which have not been altered in a century). Many
provisions of the Foraker Act have never been repealed. Instead, they were retained in the
Federal Relations Act of 1950. See Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, ch. 446, § 4, 64 Stat. 319
(1950) ("That all laws or parts of laws applicable to Puerto Rico not in conflict with any of the
provisions of this Act, including the laws relating to tariff, customs, and duties on importations
into Puerto Rico prescribed by the Act of Congress... approved [April 12, 1900] and hereby
continued in effect....
4 1d.§ 3.
41 See CABRANES, supra note 1, at 47 ("If the Court had decided that Puerto Rico was a terri-
tory of the United States equal in status to the incorporated territories of the American West,
the imposition of duties on goods carried between the island and the continental United States
would have been prohibited."); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("[AIll Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
42 Trias Monge, supra note 7, at 44; accord L6pez Baralt, supra note 24, at 239. See generally
Carman Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 291 (1898) (examining
the extent of the power of the United States federal government to annex lands in their military
possession).
LOPEZ BARAIT, supra note 24, at 238; accord TRIAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 44. See generally
C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365, 376 (1899) (explaining
why and how territories are different from states comprising the United States). Two types of
protectionism drove this doctrine: economic protectionism, which feared the influx of prod-
ucts from the newly acquired territories, and racial protectionism, which was concerned with
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third theory, defended by Abbott Lawrence Lowell, "went halfway be-
tween the other two in a sort of compromise. ''44 Lowell argued that
the Constitution:
allowed for two kinds of territories: those that were part of the United
States and those that were not part of but were instead possessions of the
United States. The Constitution did not extend completely to the latter,
but there were certain provisions embodying certain rights that limited
the otherwise plenary powers of Congress.
Final resolution of this dilemma rested on the shoulders of the
United States Supreme Court. In the Insular Cases,46 the Court de-
clared that the tariff provision was constitutional because Puerto Rico
was "a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but
not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Con-
stitution.,,47 To the detriment of freedom and self-determination, the
Court gave judicial credence to the imperialist views in Congress and
academia 8.4  The tariff provision became the window through which
Puerto Ricans discovered the naivete of their hope for American de-49
mocracy.
the extension of American citizenship to peoples of a different race. TRiAS MONGE, supra note
7, at 41; RONALD FERNNDEZ, LA ISLA DESENGANTADA: PUERTO RIco Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS EN
EL SIGLO XX 30 (1996).
44 L6pez Baralt, supra note 24, at 239. See generaly Abbot L. Lowell, The Status of Our New Pos-
sessions-A Third View, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 155 (1899) (arguing that possessions may be acquired so
that they become a part of the United States, subject to all the general constitutional restric-
tions except those relating to the organization of the judiciary, or possessions may be acquired
so that they do not form a part of the United States and are, therefore, not subject to constitu-
tional limitations).
45 TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 44-45.
46 See, e.g., GonzAlez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); see also infra Part III.B.
47 Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
48 One commentator has described the territorial policy at the time as follows:
Its fundamental tenets would be that the people of Puerto Rico were not ready for self-
government; a learning period, of unspecified duration, was necessary before self-
government could be extended; the eventual status should be neither statehood nor in-
dependence, but a self-governing dependency, subject to the plenary power of Congress;
the learning process required a policy of political and cultural assimilation, which neces-
sarily involved the extension of United States laws, institutions, and language to the is-
land; and living conditions should be improved to the extent possible. This colonial pol-
icy, still incipient at that moment, would prove to be a hard one once itjelled. Parts of it
still plague the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.
TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 38-39; Carlos I. Gorrin Peralta, Historical Analysis of the Insular
Cases: Colonial Constitutionalism Revisited, 56 REv. COLEGIO ABOGADOS P.R. 31, 50 (1995) ("The
anti-imperialist positions were ignored. The Jeffersonian attempt at equilibrium was aban-
doned. Colonialist constitutionalism was enthroned as the law of the land, and basic tenets of
democracy, liberty and self-determination were set aside to serve the national self interest
through the acquisition of new unincorporated territories."); see also TORRUELLA, supra note 32,
at 267 ("Relying on the dubious theories of the various academic 'hawks,' influenced, as was
Congress, by an irrelevant 'Philippine problem,' the Court, by an exiguous majority of one vote,
proceeded to invent a constitutional theory totally lacking in American historical or legal sup-
port....").
49 Luis Mufioz Rivera, leader of the Federal Party, a strong supporter of autonomy for
Puerto Rico and one of the most prominent political leaders in the history of Puerto Rico, best
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B. The Jones Act Years (1917-1951)
In 1917, the United States Congress enacted the Jones Act.50 This
Act contained very modest improvements over the Foraker Act in
terms of self-government, but "retained the substance of colonial tu-
telage."51 The Act granted United States citizenship to all "citizens of
Puerto Rico," as defined in the Foraker Act.52 This was merely a col-
lective naturalization, however, and no provisions were included to
make future Puerto Ricans born in the island United States citizens at
birth.
Two major policy motivations drove the grant of United States
citizenship under the Jones Act. First, there was the desire to differ-
entiate Puerto Rico from the Philippines and Hawaii. The former
was already being groomed for independence, while the latter was be-
ing groomed for statehood; in the case of Puerto Rico, however,
53Congress intended neither of those alternatives. Through the con-
expressed this sentiment in a letter he wrote explaining why the Federalists would not partici-
pate in the holiday celebrating the American invasion: "Because we thought that an era of lib-
erty was dawning and instead are witnessing a spectacle of terrible assimilation .... Because
none of the promises made were kept and because our present condition is that of serfs at-
tached to conquered territory." TRiAs MONGE, supra note 7, at 52 (quoting LUIS MLi&OZ
RIVERA, CAMPA&AS POLiTIcAS 279 (1925)). The policy of Americanizing Puerto Rico as fast as
possible further compounded the disappointment. Id. at 55 ("The teaching in English of the
whole public school curriculum started as soon as teachers became available. The situation was
deeply resented by most segments of the population. It was not until the end of the forties,
when Puerto Ricans took firm control of the education department and most public offices,
that these practices were repealed...."). In 1904, the Federal Party was abolished and a new
party, the Union Party, was formed. A month before forming the new Union Party, Mufioz Riv-
era issued the following manifesto:
You are nothing but slaves. You are ruled by a President that is elected without your
vote. A Council appointed at the whim of the President legislates for you. You do not
even effectively intervene in the approval of the taxes that weigh upon you. Such a
shame would not be tolerated by... even the Patagonian tribes; such slavery would be
undeserved if you manfully attempt to reject it, but it shall degrade you if you sheepishly
accept it.
TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 59 (quoting 1 BOLIVAR PAGAN, HISTORIA DE LOS PARTIDOS
PoLTicos PuERTORRIQUEIaOS, 1898-1956, at 99-102 (1959)). Not surprisingly, the Union Party
became the first party to officially mention independence as a legitimate form of self-
government. Id.
See Organic Act of 1917, amended by Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, ch. 446, § 464
Stat. 319 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-894 (1995)).
1, MORALES CARR16N, supra note 23, at 200. TheJones Act instituted an elective Senate, but
one that found itself subject to the veto not only of the Governor, but ultimately of the United
States Congress. The Senate was given the power to approve the appointments of most of the
department heads, although for many years no Puerto Rican occupied such positions. See Or-
ganic Act of 1917 §§ 25-39. A bill of rights was also provided, albeit a limited one. See id. § 2; see
also MORALES CARRION, supra, at 200; 2 Jost TRiAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTTUCIONAL DE
PUERTO Rico 88-105 (1981).
52 Organic Act of 1917 § 5. The Foraker Act had provided that all the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico were "citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States...." Organic Act of April 12, 1900 § 7.
53 See TORRuELLA, supra note 32, at 85 ("Two basic undercurrents were perceptible through-
out the political period: first, that Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans were to be treated differ-
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ferment of citizenship, the United States was proclaiming "the future
of Puerto Rico to be something other than national independence,"
54
while denying that citizenship entailed an immediate eventual offer
of statehood.
World War I was the other policy motivation. The need to estab-
lish a safe and stable base of operations in the Caribbean became
acute 55-a concern reflected in the purchase of the Danish West In-
dies (currently known as the United States Virgin Islands) and the
conferment of citizenship to its inhabitants., 6 In his message to Con-
gress on December 5, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson explained
that there was "uneasiness among the people of [Puerto Rico] and
even a suspicious doubt with regard to our intentions concerning
them which the adoption of the pending measure would happily re-
move .... 57 Thus, the fear of dissent and disloyalty were pivotal in
pressuring the United States to give Puerto Ricans citizenship.,5 The
ently from the Philippine Islands and the Filipinos; and second, that Puerto Rico was destined
to remain permanently a part of the United States."); TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 76 ("The
Jones Act reaffirmed instead the decision to keep Puerto Rico as an increasingly Americanized
colony, on the road to self-government, but always to be securely subject to the sovereignty of
the United States.").
M CABRANES, supra note 1, at 6. This unequivocal decision to preserve American sovereignty
over Puerto Rico was intimately linked with its military interests. GARCiA PASSAIACQUA, supra
note 23, at 76; see also TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 65 ("I believe it is idle to consider or to dis-
cuss any future for the people of Porto Rico as separated from the United States.") (quoting
1913 SECRETARY OF WAR ANN. REP. 41); id. at 119 ("Puerto Rico was to be held instead in perpe-
tuity, or as long as needed, firmly under the control of Congress, as a useful guardian of eastern
access to the Panama Canal, a key part of the security system for the Caribbean area ... ").
America's military interest in the Caribbean antedates the Declaration of Independence, see
TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7 at 21, and increased under the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan,
who greatly influenced President Theodore Roosevelt. See generally A. T. MAHAN, THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783 (1914) (arguing that naval power was the
key to national greatness and that United States security required full dominion of both the
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean around Hawaii). See generally GARCiA PASSALACQUA, supra
note 23, at 75 ("Our island was considered essential for the control of two of the most impor-
tant maritime passages controlling the entrance into the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mex-
ico .... ) (author's translation). During the Cold War, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean were
considered national security issues and public policy wmas established through that prism. Id. at
80-82.
5 By 1914, the Navy feared German interventions in the Caribbean, prompting the United
States to establish their primary Caribbean naval base in Puerto Rico. Id. at 77; see also MORALES
CARRIt6N, supra note 23, at 197 ("After the outbreak of World War I, there was great fear that
the Germans would secure a coaling station in Haiti and would take advantage of the European
upheaval to absorb Denmark and obtain legal title to the Danish West Indies.").
See MORALES CARRION, supra note 23, at 198 ("The treaty [of purchase] was signed on
August 4, 1916, and presented to Congress as a way of thwarting German ambitions in the Car-
ibbean. Under Article VI, the inhabitants who did not declare within a year their intention to
preserve their citizenship in Denmark were held to have renounced it and to have accepted
American citizenship."); accord GARCiA PASSALACQUA, supra note 23, at 77.
MORALES CARRION, supra note 23, at 198 (quoting 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES
OFTHE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2578-79 (Fred L. Israel ed. 1966)).
58 Some commentators have argued that the grant of citizenship to Puerto Ricans was de-
signed to conscript them for service in World War I. See, e.g., MANUEL MALDONADO-DENIS,
PUERTO RIco: A Socio-HIsToRIc INTERPRETATION (1972). United States citizenship is not a
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United States was unequivocally signaling its intention to retain sov-
ereignty over Puerto Rico.
The grant of citizenship did not reflect a congressional intent to
augment personal rights or facilitate incorporation into the United
States.59 At this stage the Supreme Court again intervened, lending
judicial backing to the theory that the grant of United States citizen-
ship did not entail incorporation into the United States6o and added
no new rights to those already granted to Puerto Ricans under the
Foraker and Jones Act.6' While the United States reaffirmed its sov-
ereignty over Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans remained in political limbo
and the much-heralded United States citizenship appeared worthless.
C. The Commonwealth Years
Subsequently, both the citizenship condition of Puerto Ricans and
the political status of the Island changed.6 ' The Immigration and Na-
requirement for conscription, however. CABRANES, supra note 1, at 16. Aliens were subject to
the draft during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. Id. at 16 (quoting
Civil War Conscription Act of 1863, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 731 (1863); Spanish American War Act
of 1898, ch. 187, § 1, 30 Stat. 361 (1898); Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 2, 40 Stat. 76 (1917)).
As nationals of the United States, see Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 13 (1904), "Puerto Ricans
would have been subject to conscription into military service even if they had remained 'citizens
of Puerto Rico.'" CABRANES, supra note 1, at 16.
At least one commentator has argued that the military concerns went beyond fear of dis-
loyalty and extended to concerns about a possible German invasion of Puerto Rico. SeeJuan M.
Garcfa Passalacqua, Jmposici~n o Prstamo?: La Cuidadanfa Norteamericana de 1917, 28 REV.JUR.
U. INTERAMEIcANA P.R. 225, 231-33 (1994) (arguing that only with the conferment of citizen-
ship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico did the United States strengthen and firmly establish its
sovereignty in the Caribbean and forestall a German invasion into American "sovereign" terri-
tor).The citizenship provision of the Jones Act in 1917, partly because a similar bill had been
introduced in each Congress following the enactment of the Foraker Act, produced little de-
bate and neither the Senate nor House report devoted any particular attention to it. CABRANES,
supra note 1, at 81. Yet, "[t]he legislative record concerning proposals for conferring American
citizenship upon the Puerto Ricans in the years after the Foraker Act and the Insular Cases sug-
gests that those concerned with the subject understood that American citizenship would yield
little or nothing in the way of personal rights and liberties for the inhabitants of Puerto Rico."
Id. at 51; see also id at 71-72 (noting that the Senate Report on the 1913 citizenship bill "rejected
the notion that citizenship would involve 'the right to participate in the government [or] affect
in any particular the question of statehood'").
60 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
61 Id. at 308. See also infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
62 From the enactment of the Jones Act in 1917 to the establishment of the Commonwealth
in 1952, the constitutional relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico remained
unaltered. Important changes took place, however, in the economic, social, and political scene.
In the years immediately following the Jones Act, "cracks appeared in the old colonial policy,"
including the independence of the Philippines, the failure of the Americanization policy, the
constant Puerto Rican requests for more self-government, and the need to repress the nascent
nationalist movement. TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 86. These cracks expanded in the 1930's.
"After forty years of United States rule, the economy of the island was in shambles, little better
than at the end of the nineteenth century." Id. at 98. The island, in fact, had become "little
more than a plantation." Id. at 86. The economic stagnation compounded with political explo-
siveness, and "the regime became more impatient and repressive with the believers in inde-
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tionality Act of 1952 made every person born in Puerto Rico a citizen
of the United States at birth.65 Thus, Puerto Ricans no longer de-
pended on the naturalization grant of the Jones Act.
In the political arena, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" was es-
tablished in 1952.65 Under this political arrangement, Puerto Ricans
pendence." Id. at 88. In this context, Pedro Albizu Campos, "long to be remembered in Puerto
Rican history as the heir to the nineteenth-century revolutionary tradition represented by exiled
Puerto Rican independence leaders, became president of the old Nationalist party" Id. at 92.
See alsoJAMES L. DIETZ, HIsToRIA ECON6MICA DE PUERTO Rico 180 (1989) ("The Nationalist
program followed the nationalist and populist tradition of Latin America .... It rejected for-
eign control over Puerto Rican resources, labor, and politics in favor of native power.")
(author's translation). See generally DIETZ, supra, at 154 ("In general terms, the legitimacy of the
United States control over Puerto Rico was being questioned by an ample spectrum of society as
a result of the economic collapse.") (author's translation); TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 121
(arguing that Balzac, along with the "abrasive suprapatriotism" of Governor Reilly "ignited the
creation of the Nationalist Party" in 1922).
The economic situation also changed dramatically. Through Operation Bootstrap, an
industrialization program developed by Teodoro Moscoso and Luis Munoz Marn, Puerto Rico
left behind its days as "little more than a plantation" and experienced "a remarkable economic
transformation." MALDONADO, supra note 6, at xii. From a "centuries-old rural-agricultural
country with all its traditional socioeconomic characteristics, within a generation and within a
democratic framework, Puerto Rico became a modern urban-industrial society. In practically
all economic and social indices-from pre capita income to life expectanc)---Puerto Rico
joined the ranks of the 'developed countries' of the world." Id. See also DIETZ, supra, at 198. See
generally DIETZ, supra, at 262 (showing GNP increased from $754.5 million in 1950 to $4,687.5
million in 1970 and GNP per capita increased from $342 million in 1950 to $1,729 million in
1970). The industrialization program had two stages. From 1941 to 1949, the government un-
dertook agrarian reform, infrastructure development, and limited industrialization through
government-owned enterprises. DIETZ, supra, at 203. From 1945 to 1953 the agrarian reform
and agriculture in general received less attention, the government-owned enterprises were pri-
vatized, and private capital-based industrialization (Operation Bootstrap) began. Id. at 203-04.
"In both stages, however, the planning and promoting activities set forth by the government
constituted the driving force for change." Id. at 204 (author's translation). Aside from the ef-
forts by Puerto Rican leaders, the success of Operation Bootstrap was linked to the demand for
manufacturing during World War II, the ensuing economic boom, and the grant of federal tax
incentives.
63 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994) ("[A]lI persons born in
Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
are citizens of the United States at birth.").
64 The body politic created under the Puerto Rico constitution was the Estado Libre Asociado
de Puerto Rico, which literally translates into "Free Associated State of Puerto Rico." In English,
however, it is officially called the "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Resolution No. 22 of the
Constitutional Convention: "To determine in Spanish and in English the name of the body
politic created by the Constitution of the people of Puerto Rico." Constituent Assemb. R. 22,
Plenary Sess. (P.R. 1952), reprinted in 1 P.R. LAWS ANN., at 135-36 (1999) [hereinafter Resolution
No. 22]. Resolution No. 22 explains that the expression "estado libre asociado" should "not be
rendered 'associated free state' in English inasmuch as the word 'state' in ordinary speech in
the United States means one of the States of the Union... ." Id. But see MORALES CARRION,
supra note 23, at 277-78 (explaining that the translation was made to "allay fears that Puerto
Rico was asking for statehood"); TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 114 (arguing that "'Estado Libre
Asociado de Puerto Rico' ... should have been translated 'Free Associated State of Puerto
Rico,' but was instead dubbed, by convoluted and misleading interpretation of the Spanish
terms, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico").
The process to establish the Commonwealth started with Public Law 600, which was
adopted "in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a govern-
ment pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption." Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, § 1, 64
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drafted their own constitution" and acquired, in the words of Presi-
dent Harry Truman, "full authority and responsibility for local self-
govermnent" 6 1 Contrary to the two previous organic acts-the Fora-
ker Act and the Jones Act-the constitution was not the work of Con-
gress, but the work of the people of Puerto Rico. Finally, "We, the
people of Puerto Rico"' were taking control over their destiny.
The effects of this change on the constitutional relationship be-
tween the United States and Puerto Rico have never been fully de-
fined and have been subject to endless discussion. Many commenta-
tors argue that the Commonwealth arrangement was based on a
bilateral pact between the United States and Puerto Rico unalterable
except by mutual consent; it constituted an irrevocable grant of sov-
ereignty from the United States to Puerto Rico; and it represented a
new status for Puerto Rico vis-a-vis the United States. 69  The state-
Stat. 319. The Act was submitted for approval to the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum
and upon approval of the referendum, the Legislature of Puerto Rico was authorized to call a
constitutional convention. Id. § 2. Once the constitution was effective, Public Law 600 re-
named the Jones Act as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and provided for the repeal of
certain provisions. Id. §§ 4, 5. The people of Puerto Rico approved the Act by a vote of 387,016
to 119,169. The Popular Democratic Party had seventy delegates, out of ninety-two, in the con-
stitutional convention. MORALES CARRI6N, supra note 23, at 277; see TRiAs MONGE, supra note 7,
at 113-14.
The constitutional convention met from September 17, 1951 to February 6, 1952 and
submitted the constitution to a referendum on March 3, 1952. TRiAs MONGE, supra note 7, at
114-15. The constitution was approved by a vote of 373,594 to 82,877 and was subsequently de-
livered to President Harry Truman, who transmitted it to Congress on April 22, 1952. MORALES
CARRION, supra note 23, at 278. Congress approved the Constitution, subject to two amend-
ments thatwere later approved by the constitutional convention. TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at
117-18. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico officially came into being on July 25, 1952-not
coincidentally, the same date that marked the American invasion in 1898.
6 Jose Trias Monge described the Puerto Rico constitution as follows:
The constitution followed the main lines of a typical state constitution, with some inter-
esting innovations. The bill of rights, largely patterned after the Universal Declaration of
Rights approved by the United Nations and the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, approved at Bogoti by the Organization of American States, was generally
broader than the usual state constitution, a fact that created problems when the constitu-
tion was considered by Congress. The article dealing with the legislative power also had
a striking provision. As the Popular Democratic party had proved to be so powerful at
the polls and the minority parties had been able to elect only a token number of legisla-
tive representatives, the PDP delegates themselves requested a device to ensure that, no
matter how many votes were polled by the majority party, the minority parties would to-
gether always be able to elect at least one-third of the members of each chamber. The
article dealing with the judicial power was also innovative, and the constitution of Puerto
Rico became the second constitution within the United States (after that of New Jersey)
to provide for full unification of its court system.
TRIAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 114; see also MORALES CARRI6N, supra note 23, at 277 ("The result
was a very progressive and widely praised document which asserted Puerto Rico's natural rights
and its commitment to the democratic system and human rights, as well as its loyalty to the
principles of the federal Constitution and the idea of a compact."). The fact that the constitu-
tion had to be approved by Congress, however, "had a dampening effect on the efforts to break
new ground." TRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 114.
67 H.R. DOc. No. 82-435, at4 (1952).
P.R. CONST. pmbl.
69 See generally MORALES CARRION, supra note 23, at 279-80 (describing the popular view in
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ments of the United States before the United Nations in 195370 and a
series of court decisions71 seem to support this position.
Others commentators have pointed out, however, that the crea-
tion of the Commonwealth did not alter Puerto Rico's condition as
an unincorporated territory of the United States.72 The legislative re-
cord73 and a different series of court decisions74 support this position.
Puerto Rico that the "compact" ended the colonial relationship and began a "new federal rela-
tionship"); ANTONIO FERN6S ISERN, ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO Rico 81-195 (1974); 3
JOSE TRiAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO Rico 40-59 (1982).
70 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 83D CONG., REPORT BY HON. FRANcES P. BOLTON
AND HON. JAMES P. RicHARDS ON THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 241 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1954) ("It would be wrong, however, to hold
that.., the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not signify a fundamental
change in the status of Puerto Rico.") quoted inTRiAS MONGE, supra note 7, at 123.
See Rodrfguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a state,
is an autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.'" (quot-
ing Calerdo-Taledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974)); Cordova & Simon-
pietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36,41 (Ist Cir. 1981) ("Puerto Rico's
status changed from that of a mere territory to the unique status of Commonwealth. And the
federal government's relations with Puerto Rico changed from being bounded merely by the
territorial clause .... "); Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313-14 (D.P.R. 1953) (concluding
that a new relationship was established between Puerto Rico and the United States when, as a
result of the enactment of Public Law 600, Congress could no longer exercise plenary jurisdic-
tion over the Island). But see TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 162 ("A reading of that opinion
[Mora v. Tortes] shows that the findings regarding [Public Law 600] and Puerto Rico's status
were totally unnecessary to a ruling of the case, and are at best dicta.").
72 See TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 193 ("[T)he early cases in which the so-called 'irrevoca-
ble compact' theory was expounded have not been followed by any of the appellate courts.");
id. at 194 ("Although no appellate court has ruled that Congress' plenary power to legislate in-
tra-Puerto Rico has ceased, several have in fact intimated that such power has continued post-
Commonwealth .... Furthermore, it is the existence of such plenary power in Congress that determines
the real status of Puerto Rico, and not the title given to the political entity or the granting of inter-
nal autonomy."); David Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 255, 314 (1952) ("In Constitu-
tional theory, Congress continues to possess plenary authority over Puerto Rico which, in status
if not in title, remains a territory."); Helfeld, supra note 16, at 103 ("However Commonwealth
status may be defined it remains 'unincorporated' in a constitutional sense."); see alsoJos Trias
Monge, El Estado Libre Asociado Ante los Tribunales, 1952-1994, 64 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 41 (1995)
("The nature, extent, and even the existence of a true compact, amendable only by mutual con-
sent, have not been determined precisely.") (author's translation).
73 See Hearings on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336, To Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Gov-
ernment by the People of Puerto Rico Before the Committee on Public Lands, 81st Cong. 33 (1950)
(statement of Governor Luis Munoz Marn) ("You know, of course, that if the people of Puerto
Rico should go crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again."); id. at 43 (statement
of Edward Millar, Assistant Sec'y of State for Inter-Am. Affairs) (explaining that there would be
no change in Puerto Rico's "political, social and economic relationship" to the United States);
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J. Res. 151, 82d Cong. 43-44
(1952) (statement of Irwin Silverman, Chief Counsel, Office of Territories, Dep't of the Inte-
rior) ("We now solemnly enter into a compact with the people of Puerto Rico. It would be in
the nature of contractual obligations. It is our hope and it is the hope of Government, I think,
not to interfere with that relationship but nevertheless the basic power inherent in the Congress
of the United States, which no one can take away, is in the Congress as provided for in article
IV, section 3 of the Constitution of the United States."); S. REP. No. 1779, at 3 (1950) ("The
measure would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic relation-
ship to the United States.").
See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) ("Congress, which is empowered under
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This debate has been going on since 1952, and while most Puerto Ri-
cans admit that some change is necessary, the efforts have been un-
successful. '5 Puerto Ricans, then, remain with a fifty-nine year-old
Commonwealth that even its supporters wish to change, and a sec-
ond-class citizenship and political condition that have remained unal-
tered for the last eighty-three years.
II. IGARTUA DE LA ROSA V. UNITED STATES THE CASE THAT
(BRIEFLY) GAVE PUERTO RICANS THE RIGHT To VOTE
FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
In Igartfia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartfia 1),76 a group of resi-
dents of Puerto Rico claimed that their inability to vote for the Presi-
dent and Vice President of the United States violated their constitu-
tional rights. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 78 The court cited Sdnchez v.
United States,7 9 involving a similar constitutional challenge, and held
that the Constitution did not grant citizens the right to vote, leaving
the matter "entirely to the States."" The court also cited Attorney Gen-
eral of the Territory of Guam v. United States,81 where the court rejected a
similar challenge by residents of Guam. 2 In that case, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likewise concluded that the Constitu-
tion did not grant American citizens the right to elect the President.83
Based on this jurisprudence, the Court in Igarti(a I concluded that
"granting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico the right to vote in
presidential elections would require either that Puerto Rico become a
the Territory Clause of the Constitution ... to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory... belonging to the United States,' may treat Puerto Rico differently from
States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions."); Dvila-Pfrez v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 2000) (Puerto Rico is "still subject to the plenary powers of
Congress under the territorial dause."); Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir.
1956) ("The mere change of the name of Puerto Rico to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico did
not change Puerto Rico from a territory to a commonwealth unless its form of government was
so changed as to actually make it a commonwealth.").
75 See TRiAs MONGE, supra note 7, at 124 ("Puerto Rico leaders would spend the rest of the
[twentieth] century unsuccessfully trying to convince the United States to allow full decoloniza-
tion."); see also TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 194 (discussing the attempts since 1952 to "culmi-
nate" the Commonwealth's development).
76 842 F. Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1994), aff/d, 32 F.3d 8 (lst Cir. 1994).
77 Id. at 608.
78
19 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R. 1974).
90 See Igartfia 1, 842 F. Supp. at 608 (quoting Sdnchez, 376 F. Supp. at 241).
81 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
Seelgarta I, 842 F. Supp. at 609 (quoting Att'y Gen. of the Ten, of Guam, 738 F.2d at 1019).
Att'y Gen. of the Ten, of Guam, 738 F.2d at 1019 ("The right to vote in presidential elections
under Article II inheres not in citizens but in states.").
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
state, or that a constitutional amendment, similar to the Twenty-
Third Amendment, be adopted."8'
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the claims. 5 The court held that pursuant to Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution, 6 "only citizens residing in states can vote
for electors and thereby indirectly for the President.", 7 Only a consti-
tutional amendment or a grant of statehood could provide the resi-
dents of Puerto Rico the right to vote in the presidential election.ss
Six years later, the same group of residents of Puerto Rico
brought suit claiming their right to vote in presidential elections be-
cause, as United States citizens, they were "vested with the inherent
power to vote for those who represent them." 9  The court distin-
guished this case from Igartza I, explaining that while Igartiia I "cen-
tered on Plaintiff's inability to vote for the President and Vice Presi-
dent, the instant case revolves around their inability to elect delegates
to the electoral college."90 This time, the district court agreed with
the plaintiffs, finding that United States citizens residing in Puerto
Rico had the right to vote in presidential elections and ordered the
Puerto Rico government to create the mechanisms to enable the vot-
ing.91
The Igartfia II court presented a set of rationales to sustain its
holding. First, the court found that a United States citizen's right to
vote in presidential elections was not derived from Article II of the
Constitution,92 but from "the principles entrenched in the Bill of
Rights."93 Article II, the court explained, dealt with a question of fed-
eralism and did not bestow any right.94 Second, the court explained
842 F. Supp. at 609. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 ("The District constitut-
ing the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress
may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a
State, but in no event more than the least populous State .. ").
85 Igartdia de la Rosa v. United States (Igartzia 1), 32 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1994).
86 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. ..
87 Igartda 1, 32 F.3d at 9.
88 Id. at 10.
89 Igartia de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 (D.P.R. 2000) (denying the
government's motion to dismiss the suit), affd, Igartia de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp.
2d 228, 230 (D.P.R. 2000). As noted previously, these cases will be collectively referred to as
Igartfia I.
9 Igartnia II, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
91 Igartda II, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
92 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Repre-
sentative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be ap-
pointed an Elector.").
93 Igartdfa II, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
94 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) ("The 'difference between a federal
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that the Supreme Court already recognized the right to vote as a na-
tional right guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.9' Thus, the Igart(a
H court concluded that even if Article II is stricken from the Constitu-
tion, there would still be a right to vote for the President." Finally,
the court held that the use of the word "state" in the Constitution is
not limited to the fifty states.97 The Constitution "preexists the terri-
torial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States,"98 and
at the time of the ratification, "the only political subdivisions capable
of conducting national elections were the States."' The court also
pointed out that the word "state" in the Constitution "has evolved in
understanding and meaning. ' 0°
Without addressing any of the issues listed above, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.'l l The First Cir-
cuit noted that Igartfta , where it had declared that the residents of
Puerto Rico had no constitutional right to participate in Presidential
elections presented an identical case and constituted binding author-
ity.0 2 In Igartfta I, the court relied heavily on Attorney General of the Ter-
ritory of Guam v. United States. 03 As discussed earlier, in that case, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the United
States citizens of Guam could not vote in presidential election be-
cause Guam was not a state and, therefore, could not have electors. T'
and national government, as it relates to the operation of the government... [is] that in the former
the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy in their political capaci-
ties; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation in their individual capacities.
On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the national not the federal charac-
ter.'") (alteration in original)).
97 Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)); seeAnderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983) (stating that state-imposed restrictions on the election of the President
and Vice President implicate "a uniquely important national interest [since they] are the only
elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation"); see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972) (holding that the right to vote invokes the protection of the Equal Protection Clause).
9 Igartda ii, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
97ld. at 234-35 ("[T]he use of the term State in Article II does not mean that the United
States citizens of the territories could not cast their ballots in Presidential elections. The Article
is the product of its time.").
98 Id. at 234.
Id. at 234 (citing United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995))
(arguing that "[tihe Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion that
the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a direct link between the National
Government and the people of the States").
,00 Id. at 235 ("Congress was not precluded from extending diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion from applying to Puerto Rico despite that Article III of the Constitution vests federal courts
with the jurisdiction to hear suits 'between Citizens of different States.'").
101 Igartda de Ia Rosa v. United States (Igartiia I), 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000).
02 Id. at 83. The only difference between Igartta Iand Igartfla HIvas that in the former the
plaintiffs were seeking to vote for the President, while in the latter they were seeking to vote for
the electors that choose the President. The court held this distinction as insignificant. Igartfia
/1, 229 F.3d at 84.
103 738 F.2d at 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984).
104 Id. at 1019.
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Noting that Puerto Rico still was not a state, the court found no rea-
son to steer away from its precedent.'05
After six years of legal arguments, the courts of the United States
have repeatedly rejected the contention that the citizens of the terri-
tories have a right to vote in presidential elections. Under the ban-
ner of stare decisis, the courts have refused to give the issue more
than a glance and, in the case of Igartta II, completely ignored a set
of new arguments presented by the district court. Two questions,
specifically, have been left unanswered. First, whether the modem
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court declaring the right to vote in
presidential elections a "fundamental right protected by the Constitu-
tion" has altered the concept of the right to vote. Second, whether
the word "state" in Article II can be interpreted to include the territo-
ries. Underlying the first question is the general confusion in Ameri-
can jurisprudence over the status of the right to vote within constitu-
tional law. Underlying the second question is the need to re-evaluate
the way the United States views the status of their territories in the
contemporary constitutional framework.
III. THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS:
AN OBSTACLE TO IGARTUA 11'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO
VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?
According to the district court in Igarttia II, the right to vote is "a
function of citizenship."'0 6 This statement prompts a question never
considered by the Court: Do Puerto Ricans possess the same United
States citizenship as those born or naturalized in the United States
under the Fourteenth Amendment? Or do they possess a second-
class citizenship that makes them ineligible to enjoy the right to vote
for the President espoused by the court in Igart(ta I?
The answers to these questions start with the remarkable fact that
"the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role in the
American constitutional scheme."'0 7 The Constitution gives Congress
the power to establish a "uniform Rule of Naturalization,"'08 which
has been interpreted to give Congress exclusive power.'9 Before the
105 See Igartdfa II, 229 F.3d at 84-85.
106 Igar-aI1, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
107 T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETWEEN PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS: THE DIREcTION OF U.S.
CITIZENSHIP POLICY 42 (1998) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33
(1975)); see also CABRANES, supra note 1, at 5 n.12 ("Citizenship had not been defined in the
original Constitution and, as the late Professor Alexander M. Bickel reminded us, that Constitu-
tion 'presented the edifying picture of a government that bestowed rights on people and per-
sons, and held itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people
andpersons, not with some legal construct called citizen.").
l0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
19 Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. 259, 269 (2 Wheat.) (1817); see also 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 30,
at 280-81 (1910) (describing it as "a full complete power on the part of Congress to provide for
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adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, United States citizenship,
except in cases of naturalization, was viewed as "subordinate to and
derived from state citizenship."110 After the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, national citizenship became "primary and paramount to
state citizenship""' through the principle ofjus soli."
A. Are Puerto Ricans Constitutional or Statutory
Citizens of the United States?"
Whether Puerto Ricans are United States citizens under the Four-
teenth Amendment should not make any difference in their claim to
the right to vote, as suggested by Igart,2a f.. In a series of early citizen-
ship cases, the Court declared that a naturalized citizen became a
"member of society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen."'
This conclusion was confirmed in Afroyim v. Rusk,"5 where the Court
cited dictum from Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"6 declaring that a
naturalized citizen had all the rights of a native citizen."'
Four years later the Supreme Court reversed course, however, de-
clining to extend the principles of Afroyim to citizenship based upon
the Fourteenth Amendment."8 In Rogers v. Bellei, the Court found
that the plaintiff-who was born in Italy and whose mother was a na-
tive-born citizen of the United States-was not a Fourteenth Amend-
ment citizen because he was not naturalized "in the United States."" 9
Non-Fourteenth Amendment citizens, the Court further declared,
were "necessarily left to proper congressional action"'2 and were sub-
the creation of federal citizens by the naturalization of persons of foreign birth").
110 GETrys, supra note 30, at 3 (citing O.K. BuRDIcK, THE LAW OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION
318,322 (1922)).
II Id. at 4.
11 ALENIKOFF, supra note 108, at 8. There are two basic principles of citizenship: jus soli
(literally, right of the soil) andjus sanguinis (literally, right of blood). "Underjus soli a person is
a citizen of the territory in which he or she is bom; under the principle ofjus sanguinis, citizen-
ship is based on descent." Id. at 7. The United States applies the jus sanguinis principles to
children born to United States citizens outside its territories. Id at 14.
n3 Those born in the United States become citizens of the United States pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside."). The issues in this section are whether Puerto Ricans become
citizens under this constitutional provision or if their citizenship is dependent on a statutory
grant, specifically the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994),
and how this could affect their alleged right to vote in presidential elections under Igartfla IL
114 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898); see also Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. 738, 828 (9 Wheat.) (1824) (stating in dicta that a naturalized citizen is
"distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the
distinction ... the law makes none").
n5 387 U.S. 253, 261 (1967).
116 22 U.S. at 827.
n, 387 U.S. at 261 (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 827-28).
118 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971).
19 Id. at 827.
' Id. at 830.
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ject to the power of Congress to "withhold citizenship from persons
like plaintiff Bellei and... prescribe a period of residence in the
United States as a condition precedent without constitutional ques-
tion."'
2 1
What do these cases mean for Puerto Ricans? In the eyes of some,
because Puerto Ricans are neither born nor naturalized "in the
United States," Congress has wide powers to define the contours of
their citizenship, including the power to withdraw it.' One could
argue that Puerto Ricans are in fact "born in the United States" for
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, just as the Immigration
and Naturalization Act declares. 23  Yet, the applicability of Four-
teenth Amendment citizenship to persons born in United States terri-
tories has never been fully determined 24 and there are strong reasons
to believe that it was never so intended. 1
2
5
Non-Fourteenth Amendment citizens might be subject to with-
drawal of citizenship and other restrictions imposed by Congress, but
Congress has no power to grant or revoke the right to participate in
presidential elections. As will be seen later, an individual's right to
vote in presidential elections is granted by the states-not by the fed-
eral government. 2 1 Since there is no federal right to vote for the
President that Congress can take away, whether Puerto Ricans can
vote for the President has little to do with whether they are citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
121 Id. at 831.
122 SeeJuan M. Garcia Passalacqua, supra note 58, at 238-39 (arguing that the United States
can revoke the United States citizenship of Puerto Ricans). But seeJoseJulihn Alvarez Gonz;Uez,
The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans; 27 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 309, 336 (1990) ("The fact that citizenship is a concept closely connected to indi-
vidual rights, and one more relevant to the international, rather than to the domestic, realm,
could lead the Supreme Court to hold that there is a constitutional difference between being
born in Italy and being born in Puerto Rico.").
123 See8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994).
124 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 108, at 14 n.21. But see GETrYs, supra note 30, at 14 ("Whenever
territories have been incorporated into the United States... birth in those territories has been
construed as birth 'in the United States' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
125 See L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 235-36 (arguing that Puerto Ricans did not become
United States citizens before the Jones Act of 1917 because the Fourteenth Amendment is only
coextensive throughout the United States, and the United States did not include unincorpo-
rated territories like Puerto Rico); Alvarez Gonzilez, supra note 122, at 326-31 (rejecting the
notion that Congress's determination that Puerto Rico is "in the United States" for the purposes
of the Immigration and Nationality Act also applies to the Fourteenth Amendment); Juan M.
Garcia Passalacqua, supra note 58, at 236 (noting that the Committee Report of the Nationality
Act of 1940 stated that Puerto Ricans were statutory, and not constitutional, citizens).
126 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (quoted supra note 92); see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 35 (1892) ("[T]he appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively
to the States under the Constitution of the United States."); discussion infra Part IV.
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B. Does the Status of Puerto Rico as an Unincorporated Territory
Affect the Rights as United States Citizens
of Those Residing in Puerto Rico?
Puerto Rico's status within the United States constitutional
framework, and not whether Puerto Ricans are Fourteenth Amend-
ment citizens, plays a large role in limiting their rights. Determining
Puerto Rico's status within the United States framework requires ana-
lyzing the Insular Cases.
Opinions as to the handling of the territories diverged early. Jef-
fersonians "viewed the territorial system as a scheme of colonization
that would temporarily operate in a given area only until it had reached
a minimum population and after its inhabitants had experienced a
brief tutelage in self-government."12  Hamiltonians, on the other
hand, "stressed Congress' unlimited hegemony over the colonies,
which were considered more as national real estate than as developing
communities of citizens reared in the ways of democracy."128 In the
end the Jeffersonians won, as the first Congress enacted the North-
west Ordinance. Territories were afforded "a training school be-
fore the admission to statehood" and "a declaration that the ultimate
goal of territorial status was statehood."130 At least until the Spanish
American War, territories were considered part of the Union as
"states-in-training.",13
The Insular Cases broke with this policy. In De Lima v. Bidwell,5 2
the Court declared that Puerto Rico was not a foreign country for the
purposes of the tariff laws, but was a territory of the United States."
In Downes v. Bidwel'TM however, the Court held that Puerto Rico was
not part of the United States for the purposes of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 of the Constitution. 5 In what has been described as a the-
ory of "extraconstitutional power by Congress,"3 6 Justice Brown de-
clared that the power of Congress to acquire new territory "was not
127 2 GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUENJOS, BREAKrHROUGH FROM COLONIALISM:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARYSTUDYOF STATEHOOD 1111 (1984).
12 Id. at 1112.
12 See id. ("Undoubtedly, the Jeffersonian view, with its recognition of the right to self-
government and statehood, prevailed with the adoption of the Northwest Ordinances and
throughout the Nineteenth Century."); L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 240 ("[T]he very first
Congress under the new Constitution adopted in toto the Northwest Ordinance... ."). The
Northwest Ordinance provided, in general terms, a partition scheme, three stages of the devel-
opment of territorial government, "each one more advanced than the previous and the last one
taking the territory into the Union," and a bill of rights. Id. at 24.
BARALT, supra note 24, at 27-28.
132 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
132 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
133 Id. at 200.
14 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
13, Id. at 287.
13 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 53.
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hampered by the constitutional provisions.' '37  Thus, "there is noth-
ing in the Constitution to indicate that the power of Congress in deal-
ing with [the territories] was intended to be restricted by any of the
other provisions."'' 38
Justice White's concurring opinion merits a more careful look,
since his distinction between incorporated and unincorporated terri-
tories later became the law of the land. 3 9 According to Justice White,
Puerto Rico had not been incorporated into the United States upon
its acquisition under the Treaty of Paris of 1898.'14 He rejected Justice
Brown's rationale,'4 ' however, explaining that "there may nevertheless
be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be trans-
gressed, although not expressed in so many words in the Constitu-
tion.',42 Although the Constitution did not "follow the flag" to unin-
corporated territories, those rights considered fundamental in nature
limited the power of Congress over the territories. Determining what
"these 'fundamental' rights [are] has been the subject matter of in-
terminable ad hoc litigation and decision to this very day."
43
The grant of United States citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico in 1917 did not alter this predicament. Although the grant of
citizenship had been associated with incorporation, in Balzac v.
Puerto Rico the Court concluded that the Jones Act had not incorpo-
rated the island into the United States. 45  Moreover, the United
States citizenship granted to residents of Puerto Rico was one
137 182 U.S. at 285.
138 Id. at 286.
139 See Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 ("[T]he Dorr Case shows that the opinion of
Mr. Justice White... in Downes v. Bidwell has become the settled law of the court."); see also
TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 53 ("Justice Brown's... 'extension theory' ... was never followed
by the Court."); L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 263 ("[T]he concurring opinion of Justice
White ... has been reasserted and affirmed by subsequent unanimous courts, and the theory of
incorporation of territories which it developed, is now accepted as good constitutional law.").
140 Downes, 182 U.S. at 341 (White,J, concurring).
141 See id. at 291 ("As Congress in governing the territories is subject to the Constitution, it
results that all the limitations of the Constitution which are applicable to Congress in exercising
this authority necessarily limit its power on this subject.").
142 Id. at 291; see also L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 299 ("If unincorporated, then only such
provisions of the Constitution protecting the fundamental rights of citizenship were to apply.").
143 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 55; accord L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 299. See also
David Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes Are Applicable to the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 F.R.D. 452, 454 (1986) ("The doctrine of unincorporated territory
created considerable confusion over which clauses of the Constitution were applicable to
Puerto Rico.").
144 In Rassmussen v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the grant of citizenship
in the treaty acquiring Alaska was a declaration sufficient to incorporate Alaska into the United
States. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 522 (1905). See generally CABRANES, supra
note 1, at 99 ("[Flor the first time in history, citizenship was granted to a people without the
promise of eventual statehood and without the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."); L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 296 ("[TIhe reason for momentarily
abandoning citizenship as a test of incorporation is no legal reason, but one based on political
expediency.").
45 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
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"clouded by legalistic 'ifs,' 'ands,' 'buts,' and footnotes."14 6 The only
additional right earned by Puerto Ricans when they became citizens
was the right to "move into the continental United States and be-
com[e] residents of any State there to enjoy every right of any other
citizen of the United States, civil, social, and political." 7 As long as
they remain in Puerto Rico, however, they are entitled to those rights
and privileges granted by Congress and those constitutional provi-
sions under the fundamental rights paradigm of Justice White's con-
currence in Downes.
What are these fundamental rights that Justice White mentioned?
Except for the trial by jury, "all the individual rights guaranteed by
the federal Constitution had been incorporated in the Bill of Rights
of the Jones Act of 1917 and in large measure had been fully re-
spected and implemented."4 8 The right to a trial by jury is not fun-
damental; it is a procedural or remedial right.149 The protections of
the Due Process Clause are included, but the Court has refused to
specify whether it was the due process required by the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendments. It is clear, however, that only those constitu-
tional rights of a fundamental nature are considered applicable to
Puerto Ricans. Thus, whether Igarta I's alleged right to vote in
presidential elections is available to Puerto Ricans depends on
whether the Supreme Court considers it a fundamental right under
the Constitution.
IV. ANALYZING IGARTUA H. IS THE RIGHT To VOTE
FOR THE PRESIDENT REALLYA FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP?
Article II of the Constitution provides that "[e] ach State shall ap-
point, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Num-
ber of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... )151
Thus, the Constitution grants the states the power to determine how
electors will be chosen. 52 In the first few elections, legislatures in
every state chose the electors themselves--without consulting the
146 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 93.
147 Bazac, 258 U.S. at 308; see also CABRANES, supra note 1, at 51 ("In the absence of a change
in political status, it appeared that even American citizenship would not give Puerto Ricans any
additional rights, a conclusion confirmed by the Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico in 1922.").
14 Helfeld, supra note 144, at 455.
1 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309 ("The citizen of the United States living in Porto Rico can not [sic]
there enjoy a right of trial by jury under the Federal Constitution, any more than the Porto Ri-
can."); see also L6PEZ BARALT, supra note 24, at 299.
150 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974); see also Helfeld,
susa note 143, at 456.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (quoted supra note 92).
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) ("[T]he appointment and mode of appoint-
ment of electors belong exclusively to the States under the Constitution of the United States.").
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general population.13 Even when the states began holding popular
elections to select the electors, the concepts of citizenship and voting
were not always linked.5 4 If at all, citizenship was viewed as a re-
quirement for voting, and not as the vehicle granting the right to
vote.
155
For most of the early years of the American republic, citizenship
did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage. 156 In Minor v. Happer-
sett,157 the Court dissipated any doubts by declaring that "the Constitu-
tion had not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immu-
nities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted."' s This
holding was later reaffirmed in McPherson v. Blacker."'59 According to
the Court, "the right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the privi-
leges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that that amendment does not add to these
privileges and immunities."'6 Moreover, the Court inadvertently
foreshadowed how to understand the "fundamental right to vote"
trend that was to take place almost one hundred years later. The
right to vote comes from the states, "but the right of exemption from
the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The
first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the
United States, but the last has been.' 6' The Constitution protects
against attempts to discriminate with the right to vote, but the actual
conferral of the right comes from each state, and not from the Con-
stitution.
During the 1960's, however, a line of case-law developed declaring
the right to vote a fundamental right. In Wesberry v. Sanders,'62 the
Court recognized the one-man-one-vote principle in the context of
congressional elections. 163 Furthermore, it declared that "[n]o right
is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we
153 ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 45 (1994).
15 Paul Kleppner, Defining Citizenship: Immigration and the Struggle for Voting Rights in
Antebellum America, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43, 45 (Donald W.
Rogers ed., 1992).
° Id.; see also KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (AIMS
Press 1971) (1918) ("[A] man's property entitled him to vote-not his character, his nationality,
beliefs, or residence, but his property." (emphasis added)).
15 See generally PORTER, supra note 155, at 11 ("[T]he Revolution had a very slight immediate
effect on the development of suffrage.").
157 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
15 Id. at 171; see also PORTER, supra note 155, at 195 (describing the right of suffrage had
never been considered one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to change this situation).
'59 146 U.S. at 38.
160 /d.
161 Id.
162 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
163 Id. at 7.
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must live. "'6 Other rights, "even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined."" The Court followed a similar line in
Reynolds v. Sims,166 where it declared that "all qualified voters have a
constitutionally protected right to vote, and to have their votes
counted,' 67 and that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in
a free and democratic society." 68 1
Four years later, in Williams v. Rhodes,69 the Court confirmed the
validity of the language quoted above from Wesberny.Y In 1972, in a
case cited by Igarttia I in support of its argument for the right to vote
for the President as a fundamental right,"' the Court quoted the lan-
guage from Reynolds v. Sims referring to the right to vote as "a funda-vn l.- ,72
mental political right... preservative of all rights." Not only were
the courts riding the "fundamental right to vote" wave, but they were
explicitly linking this fundamental right with the possession of citi-
zenship.'73
Does this jurisprudence signal a shift in the status of the right to
vote within constitutional law? The Igartia II court seemed to think
so, arguing that "[t]he right to vote is a function of citizenship and a
fundamental right preservative of all other rights." 74 It is a right
"guaranteed by the principles of freedom of association as articulated
in the First Amendment to the Constitution and protected by the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses."75 Moreover, and relying
on Anderson v. Celebrezze,'76 there is a "uniquely important national in-
terest" in the election of "the only elected officials who represent all
the voters in the Nation."
This theory is riddled with problems. First, it directly contradicts
the holdings in McPherson v. Blacke 78 and Minor v. Happersett,'79 both
of which are still good law. These cases explicitly rejected the propo-
sition that the right to vote for the President comes from the Consti-
I Id. at 17.1 G5rd.
166 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"7 I'd. at 554 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at 561-62.
19 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
170 Id. at 31.
1 See Igartifa H, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
1 Dunn v. Blunstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562).
1 See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ("[T]he right to vote, as the citizen's link
to his laws and government, is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges." (citations
omitted)); see also Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 1975) ("The right to vote is fun-
damental to representative government. As a right of national citizenship, it is a source of con-
stitutional power. ...").
174 Igartia I, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (citations omitted).
:1 Igarila 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citations omitted).
76 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
177 Igartt7ia 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (quoting Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 794-95).
118 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
19 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
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tution or the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 80 Contempo-
rary case-law echoing these words further weakens the claim that
there is an inherent constitutionally protected right to vote for the
President.' 8'
Second, even if we accept the most liberal interpretation of the
cases cited above, most of these cases did not take place in the con-
text of presidential elections. Wesberry v. Sanders involved congres-
sional elections,' 82 while Reynolds v. Sims dealt with the constitutional-
ity of a plan for the apportionment of seats in the Alabama
legislature."8 Evans v. Cornman was a case brought by plaintiffs who
were denied the right to vote in local Maryland elections,' and
Means v. Wilson dealt with the right to vote in an Oglala Sioux Tribal
Council election.'8 5 Bullock v. Carter," a case relied on by the court in
Igartia II, involved candidates in a primary for local government posi-
tions.87 In fact, the only case directly involving the right to partici-
pate in presidential elections was Williams v. Rhodes, which considered
Ohio election laws impeding new political parties from being placed
on state ballots from choosing electors pledged to a particular candi-
date for President and Vice-President.' These cases might have re-
ferred to the right to vote, but not the right to vote in presidential elec-
tions.
Finally, it seems that Igart a II gravely misinterpreted this line of
cases. Wesbeny might have elevated the status of the one-man-one-
vote principle, but it applied that principle only to those "qualified to
vote" 89-not to every citizen of the United States-and only in the
context of congressional representation. 90 Evans stressed the need of
the citizens of a federal enclave to maintain their links with their gov-
ernment, but a federal enclave constitutionally holds a different posi-
tion from a territory like Puerto Rico.' 9' Moreover, most of the cases
involved equal protection claims. In these cases, the Court focused
1 Happerset, 88 U.S. at 177; McPherson, 146 U.S. at 38.
181 See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) ("[T]he Constitution
'does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one' and 'the right to vote, per se is not a consti-
tutionally protected right.'" (citations omitted)); see also Helfeld, supra note 16, at 106 ("There
is no 'inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for their President.'").
182 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
183 377 U.S. at 536-37.
1 298 U.S. 419 (1970).
18 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975).
186 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
187 Id. at 135-36.
18 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
189 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
190 Raskin, supra note 24, at 50 ("The logic of this ruling was that representation in Congress
is a right that belongs to the people.... .").
191 In fact, the Court in Evans stressed the similarities between a federal enclave and a state-
and not those with a territory. See Evans, 398 U.S. at 421; see also Raskin, supra note 24, at 54-63
(explaining that the differences between the residents of a federal enclave and a state are more
theoretical than real).
[Vol. 4:1
IGART(UA DE LA ROSA v. UNITED STATES
on the protection of the right to vote from undue interference, and
not with the actual concession of that right.192
Declaring the right to vote a fundamental right for equal protec-
tion purposes, but void of any independent constitutional protection,
certainly creates confusion. As one commentator pointed out, the
confusion increases when one realizes that "the Court has been ad-
dressing the more specific and subsidiary questions [regarding vot-
ing] without any kind of developed background, principle, theory or
philosophy that could guide it." In addressing the right to vote, the
Court has concentrated on issues like ballot access, and not on
whether a position must be filled by election or who has the right to
vote.9 In fact, in Williams v. Rhodes, which dealt specifically with the
right to vote in presidential elections, the Court's main concern
rested on the burdens placed upon that right if votes could have been
cast for one of only two parties. 9 Potential violations of other spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution in attempts to limit the right to
vote for the President-and not the origin of the right-have occu-
pied the Court's attention. 9  Just as it declared in McPherson, the
Court has assuned all along that the right to vote in presidential elec-
tions comes from the states-the Constitution does not give anyone
the right to vote in presidential elections. 97 The Constitution,
through the Equal Protection Clause, protects the exercise of that
192 See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 331 (1970) (holding that requiring a would-be
voter reside in the state for one year and the country for three months violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it did not further any compelling state in-
terest); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
was violated where state law made it virtually impossible for a new political party, even one with
substantial membership, or an old political party with small membership, to be placed on state
ballots to choose electors for the national President and Vice President); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (holding that apportionment that is not population based and lacks any
other rationality violates the Equal Protection Clause); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839 (8th
Cir. 1975) (reaffirming that Indian tribes that adopt Anglo-Saxon democratic processes for se-
lection of tribal representatives must comply with the one-person one-vote principle since equal
protection concepts apply to the tribes by virtue of the Indian Civil Rights Act).
193 James Gardner, The Nature of the American Constitution: Is There a Constitutional Right To Vote
and Be Represented?, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 589, 612 (1998).
194 Id.
195 393 U.S. at 31.
19 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983) (stressing the uniqueness and na-
tional scope of the presidential election in the context of a state's efforts to enforce ballot ac-
cess requirements); Wi!/iams, 393 U.S. at 29 ("[T]he Constitution is filled with provisions that
grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers
are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other
specific provisions of the Constitution."); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) ("The
right to vote intended to be protected refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and
constitution of the State."); cf Gardner, supra note 193 at 613 ("The Court has treated the right
to vote only as a relative right under the Equal Protection Clause. So what they say is, if and to
the extent that a state chooses to grant to its own people the right to vote for its own state legis-
lature, then to that extent and no further do the people of that state also have a right to vote for
members of Congress.").
197 146 U.S. at 38.
Nov. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
right from unreasonable encroachments and limitations; actual
granting of the right lies in the hands of the states.
Where, then, does the right to vote stand? There is no constitu-
tional right to vote for the President. Both McPherson 98 and Minor v.
Happersett make this clear. There is a trend to view voting more as a
right than a privilege under the Constitution,200 but this trend has yet
"to reach its full consummation."20 ' Even then, it is doubtful how
"fully consummated" this trend can become without contravening the
Constitution. The United States Court for the District of Columbia
effectively summarized this dilemma by pointing out that "notwith-
standing the force of the one person, one vote principle in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence, that doctrine cannot serve as a vehicle for
challenging the structure the Constitution itself imposes upon the
Congress."22 In the end, the Constitution itself cannot be unconstitu-
tional. It might be time to recognize that the Constitution "is simply
not a consistently democratic instrument of government, nor is the
one-man, one-vote principle a universal constitutional absolute."
20 3
Until something is done through the amendment process to alter this
constitutional fact, it would be unconstitutional for the Court to
complete this swing towards recognition of the inherent right to vote
for the President. For now, the right is given by the Constitution to
the states, and the states decide if they wanted to give it to the people.
Since Puerto Rico is not a state, it has no right to vote for the Presi-
dent to pass along to its residents. If Puerto Ricans are to vote for the
President, they will have to rely on something other than the "fun-
damental right to vote" theory.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORD "STATE" IN THE CONSTITUTION:
DOES THE WORD "STATE" INCLUDE TERRITORIES?
Under current constitutional understanding, Puerto Ricans can-
not vote for the President until Puerto Rico becomes a state. It might
be time, however, to challenge current understanding regarding the
constitutional status of the territories. Igartzia Ii's last argument in fa-
vor of the Puerto Ricans' right to vote for the President makes this
point, suggesting that there is no reason to think that the word "state"
in Article II excludes territories. "The use of the word 'state' in the
Constitution," the court argued, "has evolved in understanding and
meaning.2 0 4 This "evolution of the word 'state"' theory is probably
198 Id.
19 88 U.S. 162, 177 (1874).
200 Helfeld, supra note 16, at 107.
201 Id.
202 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 67 (D.D.C. 2000).
203 Helfeld, supra note 16, at 102.
204 Igartfia II, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (pointing out that "Congress was not precluded from
extending diversity of citizenship jurisdiction from applying to Puerto Rico").
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the most significant, and interesting contribution of Igartaa ff. Not
only does it favor extending the right to vote for the President to
Puerto Ricans, but it forces a re-evaluation of the territorial policy
embedded in the Insular Cases.
A. Interpreting "State" in the Constitution
The district court's evolution argument is supported at least in the
context of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In Rodriguez-
Garcia v. Ddvila,2°5 the First Circuit held that Puerto Rico is considered
a "state" for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.Y The Su-
201preme Court, however, has refused to consider this issue.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the interpretation of "state" for
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under Article III. In Hepburn v.
Ellzey the Court considered whether a resident of the District of Co-
lumbia could maintain a suit in a Virginia federal court.2 0 9 In what
became the authoritative interpretation of the word "state" in the
Constitution, the Court held that Article I and II "show[ed] that the
word state is used in the [C]onstitution as designating a member of
the union."2 1 0 The Court recognized the injustice embedded in deny-
ing access to federal court to the residents of the District of Colum-
bia, but believed that it was a subject "for legislative, not for judicial
consideration."21 1 Under Hepburn, then, it was clearly established that
the word "state" encompassed only the members of the Union and,
therefore, could not include territories like Puerto Rico. It was not
dear, however, what the Court meant by "legislative consideration."
Did it mean that the amendment mechanism was available to remedy
this wrong? Or did it mean that Congress had the power to extend
the meaning of "state" in jurisdictional statutes without conflicting
2 5 904 F.2d 90 (lst Cir. 1990).
See 904 F.2d at 98 ("It is equally well established that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is
entitled to the same protections as those accorded to states under the Eleventh Amendment.");
see also Fred v. Aponte-Roque, 916 F.2d 37, 38 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought by her own citizens as well
as citizens in other states .... This principle applies equally to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.); Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 776 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The principles of the Elev-
enth Amendment, which protect a state from suit without its consent, are filly applicable to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." (citations omitted)).
207 See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142 n.1
(1993) (expressing no view on the law of the First Circuit treating Puerto Rico as a state for the
purpose of the Eleventh Amendment); Ngiraingas v. Sinchez, 495 U.S 182, 192 n.12 (1990)
("This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider Guam's claim of immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment.").
208 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
209 Id. at 451.
210 Id.
211 Id. ("It is true, that as citizens of the United States, and of that particular district which is
subject to the jurisdiction of [C] ongress, it is extraordinary, that the courts of the United States,
which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon
them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for judicial consideration.").
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with the Constitution? The Court did not consider this question
again until 1949, and even then it produced no majority opinion on
the matter.1 2
In Tidewater Transfer Co., the Court considered whether an act of
Congress extending diversity jurisdiction to the citizens of the District
of Columbia2 1 3 was consistent with Article III of the Constitution. Ac-
cording to the plurality opinion, written by Justice Jackson and joined
by Justices Black and Burton, the word "state" in Article III of the
Constitution did not include the District of Columbia.1 14 "State" cer-
tainly has many meanings, but "such inconsistency in a single instru-
ment is to be implied only where the context clearly requires it."
21 5
The context of Article III did not require an expansive interpretation,
however, because there was "no evidence that the Founders, pressed
by more general and immediate anxieties, thought of the special
problems of the District of Columbia in connection with the judici-
ary."21 6 Echoing the language of Hepburn, the Court explained that
when using "state" the Founders referred "to those concrete organ-
ized societies which were thereby contributing to the federation by
delegating some part of their sovereign powers and to those that
should later be organized and admitted to the partnership." 21 7 Ac-
cordingly, "state" did not include the District of Columbia or, for that
matter, territories like Puerto Rico.
Curiously, the plurality opinion did not declare the Act unconsti-
tutional. Congress, the Court explained, acted within its Article I
powers218 when it included the District of Columbia under the diver-
sity jurisdiction statute.1 9 The "exclusive responsibility of Congress
for the welfare of the District" allowed Congress to provide its resi-
dents with "courts adequate to adjudge not only controversies among
themselves but also their claims against, as well as suits brought by,
citizens of the various states.
'220
Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion joined by Justice Mur-
phy, disagreed. Criticizing the theory allowing Congress to extend
diversity jurisdiction despite the constitutional limitations of Article
III, the concurrence argued that "it [was] hard to see how [Article III,
§ 2] becomes no limitation when Congress decides to cast it off under
some other Article, even one relating to its authority over the District
212 See Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
2 Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143.
214 Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 587.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 588.
218 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 ("To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District... as may... become the Seat of the Government of the United States.").
219 337 U.S. at 589.
22 Id. at 590.
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of Columbia.", 2' Arguing for the reversal of Hepburn v. Elzey, Justice
Rutledge rejected a strict construction of the word "state" in Article
M.222 The concurrence summarized its counter-reasoning as follows:
"[W]hen long experience has disclosed the fallacy of a ruling, time
has shown its injustice, and nothing remains but a technicality the
only effect of which is to perpetuate inequity, hardship and wrong,
those are the circumstances which this Court repeatedly has said call
for reexamination of prior decisions."223
Where does Hepburn's statement regarding the interpretation of
"state" in Article III stand? The case was not overruled, but a majority
of the Justices rejected the Court's theory that Congress could use its
Article I power over the District to work around the limitations of Ar-
ticle III. A majority also rejected the argument that the District of,,221
Columbia was included within "state. Subsequent decisions by
lower courts have followed the plurality's rationale. In Siegmund v.
General Commodities Corp.,2s the court extended the Tidewater Transfer
Co. reasoning to the then-territory of Hawaii. 26 Although the power
of Congress to legislate over the territories is not as expressly stated as
the power over the District of Columbia, the court noted that this
power "has been held to be plenary."27 Thus, "the act in question
would be constitutional because it is a legitimate exercise of the
.,,22' This reasnpower of Congress to legislate for the territories. asoning
was later applied specifically to Puerto Rico by other lower courts.2
At first glance, these cases would suggest that Puerto Rico cannot
be considered a state under Article III; but the analysis should not
end there. First, the Supreme Court has never declared whether the
plurality's rationale in Tidewater Transfer Co. should apply to U.S. ter-
ritories; that is, it is not clear that Congress' power to legislate for the
District of Columbia is comparable to its power to "make all needful
221 Id. at 605 (Rutledge,J., concurring).
2V See id. at 617 ("It is doubtful whether anyone could be found who now would write into
the Constitution such an unjust and discriminatory exclusion of District citizens from the fed-
eral courts.").
M Id. at 618.
224 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 CAt. L. REv. 1, 25 (1993) ("[S]ubstantial majorities of theJustices rejected both the
proposition that the District of Columbia was a 'State' within the meaning of Article II, and the
progosition that Congress had the power to extend the jurisdiction of Article I courts.").
175 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949).
26 Id. at953.
27 Id. at 954.
2 Id.
2 See Americana of P.R, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1966) (holding that Arti-
cle IV provides the requisite constitutional authority for 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)); Detres v. Lions
Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1956) (applying the Siegmund rationale to Puerto Rico);
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 195 F. Supp. 47,51 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("Congress, in
enacting section 1332(d) to include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, acted within its consti-
tutional power under Article PV, section 3, clause 2....").
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Rules and Regulations, 230 respecting the territories. The courts might
have recognized Congress' power to include the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico as states under the jurisdictional statutes, but the
courts have admitted that the source of that power is unclear. 3'
Second, assuming Congress has the power under the territorial
clause to consider Puerto Rico as a "state" for diversity purposes, one
could argue that Congress should also have the power to extend the
right to vote for the President and Vice President to Puerto Ricans.
Article III deals with the rights of citizens of states to enjoy the exten-
sion of the judicial power of the United States, but-according to the
Court-Congress is authorized to extend that same right to those re-
siding in the territories. If Congress can extend access to the courts
to citizens residing in the territories, why could Congress not extend
the right to vote too? Why does Congress have the "power and duty
to provide [the] inhabitants [of the District of Columbia] ... with
courts adequate to adjudge" their claims,232 but it doesn't have the
same power and duty to extend access to the Electoral College?
The problem with this argument might lie in a basic difference
between Article II and Article III. Article II does not grant any rights
to citizens-it delegates to the states "the appointment and mode of
appointment of electors., 233 Congress does not have the power to ex-
tend the right to vote to residents of the territories because the Con-
stitution does not confer this right in the first place. There is nothing
for Congress to "extend" because Article II does not grant anything
to the citizens; it only extends this right to the states. Moreover, one
could argue that Article III deals with an issue of judicial administra-
tion, while voting for the President entails full political participation
and a role in the development of national policy.
2 34
Nevertheless, there is a strong case for heeding the words of the
concurrence in Tidewater Transfer Co. and overruling Hepburn. Time
has certainly shown the injustice of holding that the word "state" for
the purposes of Article II does not include the territories. Why is it
that restricting access to the federal courts is more unjust than deny-
ing national political participation? General access to courts is not
denied, since residents of the District of Columbia and the territories
still could get into federal court through subject matter jurisdiction
and would have access to their own courts. In the case of the right to
vote, however, the exclusion from political participation is absolute.
United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico have faithfully served in
the armed forces in defense of the U.S. and its ideals of freedom and
230 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
231 Kaplus, 368 F.2d at 433 (explaining that in Tidewater Transfer Co. a majority of the Court
could not agree on the nature of Congress' source of power).
232 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590 (1949).
233 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
2- See generally Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. at 585 ("This constitutional issue affects only
the mechanics of administering justice in our federation.").
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liberty since World War I. If Puerto Ricans are capable of defending
the nation, they also deserve political participation in the governmen-
tal bodies that send them to war. Surely, this situation "perpetuate [s]
inequity, hardship and wrong"25 and calls for a reexamination of our
understanding of the word "state" in the Constitution.
Moreover, the rationales given by the Court in Hepburn, and re-
peated by Tidewater Transfer Co., merit a more careful review. The
Court is probably right in maintaining that the word "state" originally
was intended to designate only the members of the Union. 6 There is
no evidence that the Founders thought of the "special problems" of
the District of Columbia or, for that matter, the territories, with re-
gard to Article II or any other provision of the Constitution.238
The significance behind the lack of evidence regarding the Foun-
ders' concern with territories should not be exaggerated, however.
First, and as Igart(ta 1 points out, Article II is a product of its time.
238
At the time of the Constitutional Convention "the only political sub-
divisions capable of conducting national elections were the States."239
Moreover, it is possible that the Founders excluded the territories
from their concerns not as a deliberate act, but as a reflection of the
territorial policy at the time. When the Founders thought about ter-
ritories, they envisioned them as states-in-waiting.240 Under America's
original territorial policy, territories were admitted as states as soon as
they fulfilled a series of requirements. 241 Thus, the Founders' vision
of the territories was inherently connected with the ability to admit
states. They did not envision the United States holding a territory on
a permanent basis without the implied promise of statehood-in fact,
they would have been outraged at the idea of administering a colony
242for over one hundred years. There was, then, little reason to be
concerned with the possibility of territorial participation in presiden-
tial elections or in the national judicial scheme. The territorial status
was temporary, and they would soon enjoy these rights under the
Constitution as "states."
2. Id. at 618 (RutiedgeJ., concurring).
2 See Hepburn v. Elizey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 451 (1805) ("[A]s the act of congress [sic]
obviously uses the word 'state' in reference to that term as used in the constitution [sic] it be-
comes necessary to inquire whether [the District of] Columbia is a state in the sense of that in-
strument .... [T]he members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in
the constitution [sic].").
237 See Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. at 587 ("There is no evidence that the Founders,
pressed by more general and immediate anxieties, thought of the special problems of the Dis-
trict of Columbia in connection with the judiciary.").
233 Igarttla 1!, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
29 Id. at 234.
240 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
241 Seesupranotes 129-30 and accompanying text.
242 But see 2 GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUEFOS, supra note 127, at 1112 ("[T]he
advocates of Hamiltonian expansionism stressed Congress' unlimited hegemony over the colo-
nies, which were considered more as national real estate than as developing communities of citi-
zens reared in the ways of democracy.").
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Today, however, territories are no longer seen as states-in-waiting.
Guam and Puerto Rico have been territories since the Spanish
American War, while the United States Virgin Islands have been held
since 1916. It is incredibly unfair to analyze and study the United
States constitutional framework while ignoring the presence of these
permanent territories.
There are strong arguments for not considering territories full
"states" under the Constitution. After all, there must be some differ-
ence between the status of state and that of territory. As Anderson v.
Celebrezze pointed out, however, presidential elections are the only
contest of truly national significance for a citizen of the United
States.243 The plea for the right to vote is more about letting citizens
strengthen their link with the national government than about giving
a territory additional participation. Adding territorial representatives
to the Senate certainly would create imbalances in the original consti-
tutional design.244 Giving territories full representation in the House
of Representatives might create a similar problem. 25 But allowing the
citizens of the territories to vote for the President-just like allowing
them to claim diversity jurisdiction in federal court-would do little
to alter the constitutional balance, while doing wonders for the po-
litical and legal status of those citizens.
The Insular Cases stand as one glaring legal objection to the theory
that "state" could include territories. If Puerto Rico is an unincorpo-
rated territory, how can it be considered a state in any provision of
the Constitution? In the Insular Cases, the Court clearly explained the
position of territories within the constitutional framework and in dis-
tinguishing incorporated territories from unincorporated territories,
converted the modern American territorial policy into law. Yet, if
there is a legal doctrine that perpetuates more inequity, hardship and
wrong for the citizens of the territories than the Hepburn ruling, it is
the Insular Cases. Even those that reject the inclusion of territories
under "state" should support the revision of the Insular Cases doctrine
as a step towards bringing equality and justice to the United States
citizens residing in Puerto Rico.
First, and as Torruella declared, "it is indeed ironic that from this
potpourri of judicial indecisiveness should be spawned rules of law
which would so fundamentally and adversely affect the lives of gen-
243 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983).
244 See Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2000) ("The Senate was expressly
viewed as representing the states themselves and the guarantee of two senators for each was an
important element of the Great Compromise between the smaller and larger states that ensured
ratification of the Constitution." (citations omitted)).
245 Id. at 50 ("The House provisions, after all, were 'the other side of the compromise': to
satisfy the larger states, the House was to be popularly elected, and 'in allocating Congressmen
the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's in-
habitants.'" (citations omitted)).
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,,246erations of American citizens. The concept of unincorporated ter-
ritory was borne out of a case, Downes v. Bidwell,247 that produced no
majority opinion and has created incredible confusion and endless
litigation. In fact, and as discussed earlier, we still do not know with
certainty which are the fundamental rights that Justice White so
proudly proclaimed limited congressional power over Puerto Rico. 9
The citizens of territories do not need a civics lesson to learn their
rights-they need law degrees.
Second, the legal reasoning behind the opinions was suspect even
one hundred years ago. Influenced by academic hawks and the spirit
of imperialist pursuit, the United States ignored established tradition
in the handling of territories in favor of a "constitutional theory to-
tally lacking in American historical or legal support: The so-called
unincorporated territory."'' For centuries, the territorial policy of
the United States, embedded in Jefferson's scheme for the Northwest
Ordinance and in Shively v. Bowlby,251 called for the incorporation of
territories and the object of admitting them as states. 2  The text of
the Northwest Ordinance itself suggested that the territories were
part of the United States forever.s Instead, the Court invented a le-
gal doctrine more in line with the imperialists interests of the time
declaring that Congress had supra-constitutional powers. The legal
basis for this theory was never clear, however, and is even less clear
today.2
With the granting of United States citizenship to the inhabitants
of Puerto Rico the Court had the opportunity to correct this situa-
tion. Instead, it compounded faulty legal reasoning with more faulty
legal reasoning. Ignoring another long-standing legal principle-
that the conferral of United States citizenship to a territory signaled
its incorporation25 -the Court held that the grant of citizenship to
246 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 48.
247 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (WhiteJ, concurring).
248 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
24 See discussion supra pp. 33-34.
TORRuELUA, supra note 32, at 267.
i5 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
22 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
25 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 4 ("The said territory, and the States which may be
formed therein, shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United States of America,
subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall be constitution-
ally made.").
Justice White did provide a valid policy reason for distinguishing incorporated from unin-
corporated territories, noting the problems involved if every territory that the United States
military occupied-even if temporarily--would have to be incorporated into the Union.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 308-09 (White, J., concurring). But see TRiAs MONGE, supra note 9, at 5
("Congress has no existence and can exercise no authority outside of the Constitution. Still less
is it true that Congress can deal with new territories just as other nations have done or may do
with their new territories. This nation is under the control of a written constitution, the su-
preme law of the land and the only source of our government, or any branch or officer of it,
may, exert at any time or at any place." (quotingJustice Harlan)).
See supra note 143.
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Puerto Ricans did not entail incorporation. 6 The similarities be-
tween the languages of the treaty in the case of Alaska and the Jones
Act in the case of Puerto Rico were evident.2 7 And the only differ-
ences thatJustice Taft could come up with to distinguish Alaska from
Puerto Rico were cosmetic. 25 Alaska, he explained, was an enormous
territory, sparsely populated, and contiguous to the mainland. 25 The
"establishment of standards such as distance from the United States,
ease of travel, and propensity to settlement, for the purose of de-
termining whether or not incorporation had taken place," however,
was completely novel and vague. It is also ridiculous. The rights of
citizens should not be dependent on the geographic characteristics of
their place of origin or residence. Nobody asked Puerto Ricans what
language they spoke, how easy it was to travel from the island to the
United States or the population density in Puerto Rico when they
were called to serve in the United States armed forces. Why should
these questions be asked to recognize their full rights as citizens?
Finally, all of the historical and political underpinnings of the In-
sular Cases have been removed.26' Underlying the argument that the
Constitution did not follow the flag was the concern that the treat-
ment of Puerto Rico would set a precedent for the "Philippine prob-
lem."2 62 There no longer is a Philippine problem. The Court and the
Congress also were concerned with the lack of Anglo-Saxon institu-
tions and traditions in Puerto Rico, but that problem has been re-
solved-right or wrong-after one hundred years of American rule.
Puerto Ricans were not citizens when the Insular Cases were decided,
so it was doubtful whether they deserved full rights under the Consti-
tution. Puerto Ricans, however, have been loyal citizens since 1917
and are now fully deserving of all rights and protections under the
256 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
2W Compare Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America,
March 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ. art. III, 15 Stat. 539, 542 ("The inhabitants of the ceded territory ...
shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of
the United States.... ."), and Organic Act of 1917, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 ("That all citizens of
Puerto Rico... are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, citizens of the United
States....").
258 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309 (explaining that Alaska's size, sparse settlement and proximity
to the U.S. distinguished the issue of its incorporation from Puerto Rico's incorporation).
259 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309.
260 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 99.
261 Id. at 268.
262 See 33 CONG. REC. 1994 (1900) (statement of Rep. Newlands) ("[T]he establishment of a
precedent which [would] be invoked to control our action regarding the Philippines later on;
such action embracing not simply one island near our coast, easily governed, its people friendly
and peaceful, but embracing an archipelago of seventeen hundred islands 7,000 miles distant,
of diverse races, speaking different languages, having different customs, and ranging all the way
from absolute barbarism to semicivilization."); CABRANES, supra note 1, at 24 ("Concern about
the possible effects of making the Philippines an integral part of the United States was not all
new in 1900. This concern had been the basis of much of the vocal opposition to [President]
McKinley's policy toward Spain and to the original decision to require the cession of the Phil-
ippines to the United States .... ).
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Constitution. The Insular Cases might have served the interests of the
United States in the twentieth century, but it is unclear which inter-
ests they serve in the twenty-first. The time has come to eliminate
and delegitimize a second-class citizenship that finds its moral equiva-
lent in the racist "separate but equal" doctrine.26
Commentators are not the only ones clamoring for the reversal of
the Insular Cases. Although the doctrine is alive in the Supreme
Court, the Court itself has produced some of the strongest statements
against maintaining the doctrine. In Reid v. Covert,2 Justice Black's
plurality opinion questioned the authority of the Insular Cases.26'
"The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protec-
tions against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become
inconvenient or when expediency dictates othenvise," Justice Black
explained, "is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine
the basis of our Government."26 In Harris v. Rosario, Justice Marshall
declared that the "present validity of those decisions is question-
able." 67 Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, reiterated Justice Black's statement
in Reid: "[N]either the cases nor their reasoning should be given any
further expansion.
2
6
Congress certainly has the power to change the political condition
of Puerto Ricans-it can grant statehood or independence whenever
it wishes-and deserves part of the blame. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, bears responsibility for supporting, following, and maintaining a
legal doctrine that contradicts the principles of freedom and self-
determination that America holds dearly. It is inconceivable that for
the last one hundred years the Supreme Court has allowed for a
scheme that gives the Congress "power untrammeled by constitu-
tional limitations, except those emanating from undefined 'funda-
mental' provisions. 269 A scheme that created "a class of several mil-
lion of its citizens in a subservient condition ad infinitum, with less
right than even aliens who reside in the United States."
27
1
In the Insular Cases, the United States forgot its origins, and even
the idealistic notions of manifest destiny, in favor of old-fashioned
European imperialism. It was no longer content with having territo-
ries on a waiting list for statehood, and instead wanted to participate
in the colonial experience it had so despised in 1776. In the last one
hundred years, the United States has amended many of its wrongs
26 2 GRUPO DE INVESGADORES PUERTORRIQUEROS, supra note 127, at 1125.
2 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
20 Id. at 14.
26 Id.
267 446 U.S. 651, 653 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
263 Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 476 (1979) (Brennan,J., concurring).
269 Gorrin Peralta, supra note 48, at 44.
0 TORRUELLA, supra note 32, at 268.
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previously supported under constitutional law-like racial segrega-
tion-in an attempt to move closer to the ideals of justice, equality,
and liberty. The process skipped, however, the approximately four
million citizens who cannot vote for the President who sends them to
war. These citizens are not represented in the legislative body that
has plenary powers over them, and they need law degrees and access
to legal databases to decipher which rights they can claim. The
United States can and should continue preaching the virtues of free-
dom and representative government-but it should look in its back-
yard more often. The question is "whether the United States would
remain an imperial power or whether it would live up to its principles
and rhetoric of equality for all of its peoples including those persons
living in the non-incorporated dependencies., 27' Recognizing that
there are more than "states" under the Constitution would be the
courageous thing to do. Scrapping a one hundred year-old doctrine
that creates second class citizens is the mere minimum.
CONCLUSION
If the right to vote were a fundamental right of citizenship, the
residents of Puerto Rico would enjoy it despite their second class citi-
zenship. This citizenship does not grant them every protection under
the Constitution, but it does grant them rights of a fundamental na-
ture. Igarttfa Il's brave attempt to remedy a pathetically unjust situa-
tion fails, however, because the right to vote for the President of the
United States is not a fundamental right. The Supreme Court cer-
tainly has moved towards considering the right to vote as fundamen-
tal, but the trend is far from complete. Even if considered complete,
there are doubts whether this right to vote would include the right to
vote for the President, which is entrusted to the states in the Constitu-
tion.
Igartfia II might have provided the answer in its other argument.
There is no authoritative jurisprudence, but good arguments on both
sides of the issue, for including the territories under "states" in Article
II. The idea is not implausible or menacing to the constitutional bal-
ance of the United States. More importantly, it is the right thing to
do both in light of legal doctrines unreasonably ignored by the Court
one hundred years ago and the modern historical development of
the American nation. The increase in political participation by
groups that have been long ignored has characterized, among other
things, the last century in America. Women, blacks, minorities, and
youths have experienced remarkable empowerment over the past few
decades as part of the constitutional development of the United
States. Inclusion-not exclusion-has become the norm. Expanding
21 2 GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUENOS, supra note 127, at 1125.
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political participation and strengthening citizens' direct ties with
their government has become our guide. Let the process come to
the territories.
